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Casenote
FUMBLE!: HOW THE NORTH CAROLINA COURTS DROPPED
THE BALL IN MCADOO v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
“[C]ollege sports, as overseen by the NCAA, is a system imposed by well-
meaning paternalists and rationalized with hoary sentiments about caring
for the well-being of the colonized.  But it is, nonetheless, unjust.”1
–Taylor Branch
I. STEPPING TO THE LINE OF SCRIMMAGE: INTRODUCTION TO THE
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND ITS
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Intercollegiate athletics is a multibillion-dollar business for uni-
versities, broadcasting networks, and sponsoring companies.2  For
student-athletes, who do not receive a salary, collegiate sports pro-
vides a stepping-stone to pursue a professional career.3  Addition-
1. Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-col-
lege-sports/308643/ (discussing numerous scandals in college sports and impact
of lawsuits against NCAA).
2. See Business of College Sports, SPORTS ARCHIVE BLOG (May 14, 2012), http://
thesportsarchivesblog.com/2012/05/14/the-sports-archives-the-business-of-col-
lege-sports/ (discussing how collegiate sports closely parallel big business even
though NCAA defines its principal purpose as promoting amateurism).  In 2010,
NCAA Division I schools generated a combined $6.2 billion dollars in revenue. See
id.; see also, e.g., Paula Lavigne, The Money That Moves College Sports, ESPN.COM (Mar.
3, 2010, 6:14 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=4722523
(providing diagrams of revenue and expenses as well as break down of budgets for
each collegiate athletic organization).  Division I collegiate sports have become
such a financial investment that head coaches are the highest paid employee in a
majority of states. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest-Paid
Employee a Coach? (Probably), DEADSPIN.COM (May 9, 2013, 2:23 PM), http://dead-
spin.com/infographic-is-your-states-highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228 (“You
may have heard that the highest-paid employee in each state is usually the football
coach at the largest state school.  This is actually a gross mischaracterization: Some-
times it is the basketball coach.”).
3. See Glenn M. Wong, et al., Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to Student-
Athletes in a Complicate Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
553, 555 (2011) (“About two-thirds of the 2,050 individuals drafted by the four
major domestic leagues in 2010 came directly from college.”); see also Estimated
Probability of Competing in Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic Level, NCAA
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Probability-of-going-
pro-methodology_Update20123.pdf (outlining research regarding probability of
competing as professional athlete coming out of college compared to coming out
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ally, collegiate athletics offers student-athletes an opportunity to
compete in an organized sport, which is governed by rules and reg-
ulations established by the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA).4
The NCAA is a private and voluntary organization that derives
its authority from its members.5  It consists of 1,066 private and
public universities, which are divided into three divisions generally
based on the school’s size.6  The principle purposes of the NCAA
of high school).  For every sport researched, student-athletes are drastically more
likely to be drafted by a professional sports team after competing in college athlet-
ics than high school athletics alone. See id.
4. See Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement,
and Infractions Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them and the Nature of Court Review,
12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 257, 267 (2010) (“The NCAA exists to do what no
institution can do on its own: administer championships and regulate athletics
competition . . . .  NCAA [B]ylaws and policies cover a myriad of substantive areas
as well as competition rules and scheduling.”); see also Katherine Elizabeth Mas-
kevich, Comment, Getting Due Process into the Game: A Look at the NCAA’s Failure to
Provide Member Institutions with Due Process and the Effect on Student-Athletes, 15 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 299, 301 (2005) (“The NCAA is a centralized regulatory
authority with the power to set its own standard and to enforce those standards
through various sanctions.”).  For a discussion of the NCAA’s ability to impose
sanctions, see infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
5. See NCAA CONSTITUTION art. 4.02.1, in 2008-2009 DIVISION I MANUAL
(2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D109
.pdf [hereinafter NCAA CONSTITUTION] (stating that NCAA is “a diverse, voluntary,
unincorporated Association of four-year colleges and universities, conferences, af-
filiated associations and other educational institutions”); see also Bloom v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Col. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing mem-
ber institutions join NCAA voluntarily).  While joining the NCAA is a choice made
by member institutions, student-athletes need to be part of the NCAA in order to
develop skills and attract professional recruits. See J. Trevor Johnston, Comment,
Show Them the Money: The Threat of NCAA Athlete Unionization in Response to the Com-
mercialization of College Sports, 13 SETON  HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 203, 232 (2003)
(“[I]ntercollegiate athletics provides an opportunity to develop their physical
skills, and most importantly, a forum to showcase their talents for professional
scouts.  In sum, the athletes need NCAA competition to attain a professional ath-
letic career.”).  The NCAA Division I Manual is divided into three sections based
on the article number: articles 1-6 make up the constitution, articles 7-23 make up
the operative bylaws, and articles 23-33 make up the administrative bylaws.  Each of
these three sections are cited separately throughout this Note.
6. About the NCAA, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Membership+NEW (last visited Sept. 1, 2013)
(explaining NCAA membership is composed of Divisions I, II, and III).  Members
within each division must comply with different rules and regulations. See NCAA
CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at art. 3.01.3 (stating obligation to comply with crite-
ria of specific Division).  Division I institutions are among the largest universities,
and are required to follow the Division I philosophy statement and the NCAA Con-
stitution and Bylaws as well as various compliance criteria. See Difference Among the
Three Divisions: Division I, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa+old/who+we+are/differences+among+the+divi
sions/division+i/about+division+i (last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (explaining that Divi-
sion I schools must offer at least fourteen sports, play minimum number of con-
tests per sport, and offer minimum amount of financial aid to student-athletes); see
2
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are to promote academics and maintain amateurism.7  The NCAA
has promulgated and enforced rules that govern nearly every aspect
of competition and the student-athlete experience in order to “en-
sure equitable competition and maintain the integrity of collegiate
athletics.”8  Schools that join the NCAA agree to abide by these
strict standards, which include monitoring and sanctioning anyone
within the school who violates NCAA rules, such as staff, boosters,
and student-athletes.9  Failure to enforce the Bylaws in the NCAA
Constitution can result in NCAA sanctions against the institution.10
The NCAA imposes its sanctions through the Enforcement Pro-
gram’s Committee on Infractions.11  Any institution that wishes to
also NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at art. 3.2.1 (listing requirements to be
active member of Division I).  This Note only contemplates rules that apply to
Division I athletics.
7. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at art. 1.3.1 (“A basic purpose of this
Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educa-
tional program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so
doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and pro-
fessional sports.”). But see Get the Facts About Transfer, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa
.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012/May/
Get+the+facts+about+transfers (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (quoting NCAA Presi-
dent, Mark Emmert, as stating that “some of our rules were made with competitive
intent rather than academic concern”); see also Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An
Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2003)
(questioning NCAA’s claims that its purpose is to reinforce academics among stu-
dent-athletes).
8. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at art. 1-2 (outlining rules governing
purpose and policy of NCAA as well as conduct of member institutions); see also
Rules Compliance: Enforcement, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/con-
nect/public/ncaa/enforcement/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (explain-
ing that NCAA enforcement program “holds member institutions accountable by
seeking out and processing information about possible violations of NCAA rules,
giving schools opportunity to respond and presenting facts to membership-led
committees”).  NCAA rules and legislation are proposed, voted on, and adopted by
the member institutions. See Potuto, supra note 4, at 267 (analogizing NCAA to “a
multi-subject contract entered into by more than a thousand members”).
9. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at art. 3.2.4.1 (stating that member
institutions must “administer athletic programs in accordance with” NCAA rules);
see also id. at art. 2.8.1 (stating that member institutions must enforce NCCA rules
and regulations).  The NCAA does not take action against student-athletes directly
and therefore, relies on member institutions to enforce eligibility rulings. See
NCAA OPERATIVE BYLAWS art. 14.11.1, in 2008-2009 DIVISION I MANUAL (2008),
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-3880-2008-2009-division-i-man-
ual.aspx [hereinafter OPERATIVE BYLAWS] (stating that member institution not
NCAA must prevent ineligible student-athletes from competition); accord NCAA
CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at art. 3.2.4.3 (stating duty to withhold ineligible stu-
dent-athlete from competition is member institutions and not NCAA).
10. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 19.5 (detailing new system of
penalties against member institutions based on type and number of violations).
11. See id. at art. 19.1 (“The Board of Directors shall appoint a Committee on
Infractions, which shall be responsible for administration of the NCAA enforce-
ment program.”).  The NCAA created the Committee on Infractions in 1954 with
3
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appeal a punishment imposed by the Committee of Infractions may
follow the NCAA’s internal appeals process.12  However, as a condi-
tion of membership, institutions agree that once this internal ap-
peals process is exhausted, they will not seek further outside
review.13
If the NCAA believes that a student-athlete has committed an
NCAA violation, the NCAA can declare that student-athlete ineligi-
ble from all collegiate competition.14  Student-athletes who disa-
gree with an NCAA eligibility ruling have no right to an
independent appeals process and must simply rely on their universi-
ties or colleges to file an appeal with the Committee on Student-
Athlete Reinstatement on their behalf.15  Furthermore, the NCAA
can also sanction a university that allows a student-athlete to com-
pete if the student athlete attempts to seek redress outside of the
NCAA appeals process.16  While a number of commentators have
the power to oversee investigations and punish members that violate rules quickly
and efficiently. See Greg Heller, Preparing for the Storm: The Representation of a Univer-
sity Accused of Violating NCAA Regulations, 7 MARQ. SPORTS. L.J. 295, 298-99 (1996)
(explaining creation of Committee on Infractions).
12. See NCAA ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS art. 32.10, in 2008-2009 DIVISION I MAN-
UAL (2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-3880-2008-2009-divi-
sion-i-manual.aspx [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS] (outlining internal
appeals procedures).  Generally, these internal appeals are not effective. See Infrac-
tions Decisions Stand for USC, NCAA (May 27, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.ncaa
.com/news/football/2011-05-26/infractions-decision-stands-usc (stating between
2008-2011 “only one appeal of NCAA sanctions has been successful”). But see Ke-
vin McGuire, Central Florida Football Wins NCAA Appeal at Perfect Time, BLEACHER
REP. (Apr. 22, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1613308-central-florida-
receives-ncaa-appeal-at-perfect-time (explaining how University of Central Flor-
ida’s football team accepted sanctions from NCAA but also successfully appealed
one year postseason ban).
13. See ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 12, at art. 32.11.5 (“Determinations
of fact and violations arrived at in the foregoing manner by the Committee on
Infractions or by the Infractions Appeals Committee, on appeal, shall be final,
binding and conclusive and shall not be subject to further review by the Leader-
ship Council or any other authority.”).
14. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 10.4 (stating that student-ath-
letes found guilty of unethical conduct or sports wagering by NCAA are perma-
nently ineligible from collegiate competition unless reinstated by Committee on
Student-Athlete Reinstatement).
15. See id. at art. 14.12 (explaining that member institution must file appeal
on behalf of student-athlete and provide specific reasons why reinstatement is war-
ranted); see also W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 1, 93 n.272 (2000) (“Lacking NCAA member status, stu-
dent-athletes do not have the right to file independent appeals; the rules assume
that the school will file the appeal for them.”).
16. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 19.7 (listing actions NCAA may
take “in the interest of restitution and fairness” against member institutions that
allows student-athlete to compete because of court injunction preventing enforce-
ment of NCAA ineligibility sanction).  A Congressional Subcommittee hearing and
independent reports have addressed how the NCAA enforces its rules including
4
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criticized the NCCA’s enforcement procedures over the years, the
NCAA maintains that its policies provide student-athletes and
schools with adequate protection from improper eligibility deci-
sions.17  Ultimately, state and federal courts are reluctant to inter-
fere with the NCAA’s internal decisions regardless of the issue at
hand.18  As a result, student-athletes and member institutions are
use of the Restitution Rule. Compare Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2004)
(examining NCAA’s Restitution Rule but failing to come to determination regard-
ing its legality), with Independent Report on NCAA Processes and Procedures Provides Rec-
ommendations to Streamline and Improve Operations, NCAA (June 12, 2006), http://fs
.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2006/Miscellaneous/Independent%2BReport%2
Bon%2BNCAA%2BProcesses%2Band%2BProcedures%2BProvides%2BRecom
mendations%2Bto%2BStreamline%2Band%2BImprove%2BOperations.html
(“[T] procedures provided in NCAA enforcement, hearing, appeals, and waiver
and reinstatement proceedings compare favorably with federal, administrative and
state court process[es]”).
17. See Sherry Young, NCAA Enforcement Program and Due Process: The Case for
Internal Reform, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 747, 748 (1992) (explaining complaints against
NCAA enforcement procedures and NCAA’s rejections of this criticism).  Yet, the
NCAA’s enforcement of various rules has recently made headlines due to their
perceived absurdity and unfairness toward student-athletes. See, e.g., Jeff Barker,
Terps Notes: Player Can’t Collect “Game Ball” Until He Finishes School, BALT. SUN (Sept.
3, 2013, 5:59 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/terps/tracking-the-
terps/bal-terps-notes-whitfield-cant-collect-game-ball-until-he-finishes-school-
20130903,0,4428623.story (explaining University of Maryland football player is un-
able to keep game ball because of NCAA limits on gifts to student-athletes); Gregg
Doyel, Silly NCAA Rules Stop Louisville Men from Supporting Women in Final Four, CBS
SPORTS (Apr. 10, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/
story/22045021/silly-ncaa-rules-stop-louisville-men-from-supporting-women-in-fi-
nal-four (discussing how University of Louisville could not allow men’s basketball
team to stop in New Orleans while returning from tournament in Atlanta in order
to support women’s basketball team); Justin Hussong, Recent SEC Scandal is Latest
Example of NCAA’s Flawed System, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://bleacher-
report.com/articles/1771193-recent-sec-scandal-is-latest-exampled-of-ncaas-flawed-
system (stating that South Carolina’s football program was sanctioned because
head coach Steve Spurrier’s wife sent Christmas cards to incoming freshmen );
Marine Who Played at Base Banned, ESPN.COM (Aug. 19, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://
espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9579499/marine-appealing-ncaa-rule-
preventing-playing-middle-tennessee (explaining how freshman at Middle Tennes-
see University is unable to play football for college because he is being charged
with year of eligibility for each year he played in recreational league while serving
in United States Marine Corps.); Patrick Rishe, Johnny Manziel’s Half-Game Suspen-
sion Reflects Half-Witted NCAA Justice, FORBES.COM (Aug. 28, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/08/28/johnny-manziels-half-game-suspen-
sion-reflects-half-witted-ncaa-unbalanced-justice/ (discussing wide receiver Dez
Bryant’s opinion regarding NCAA’s response to Johnny Manziel autograph scandal
compared to when NCAA suspended Dez Bryant 10 games while at Oklahoma
State for having dinner with Deion Sanders).
18. For a discussion on various courts’ belief that the NCAA should be gov-
erned by internal rules see, infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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powerless to challenge an organization that acts as “investigator,
judge, jury, and executioner.”19
In 2008, the NCAA categorized its rule violations into two
groups: secondary violations and major violations.20  Both levels of
violations can result in a reduction of the number of scholarships
that a university or college may award as well as various limitations
on the ability to recruit incoming freshmen.21  The most severe
sanction imposed by the NCAA is the suspension of a school’s
sports program due to repeat violations of NCAA rules.22  The
NCAA most notably handed down this “death penalty” to Southern
Methodist University’s (SMU) football program from 1987-1988
based on evidence that SMU was paying student-athletes to play
football.23  Moreover, an institution can receive a combination of
19. See Lisa M. Bianchi & Bryan S. Gadol, Comment, When Playing the Game of
College Sports, You Should not be Playing “Monopoly,” 1 CHAP. L. REV. 151, 152 (1998)
(stating that “[a]nytime a nongovernmental organization completely controls an
industry, the potential for abuse is dramatically increased,” which allows NCAA
immense control over all aspects of collegiate athletics).
20. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 19.02.2 (defining secondary
violation as “a violation that is isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is
intended to provide only a minimal recruiting, competitive or other advantage and
does not include any significant recruiting inducement or extra benefit” and defin-
ing major violation as any violation that does not constitute secondary violation).
The NCAA recently reorganized the categories of violations into four levels based
on the premises that this structure will allow for conduct to be sanctioned more
appropriately. See New Reform Efforts Take Hold Aug. 1, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa
.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2013/august/new+
reform+efforts+take+hold+august+1 (discussing changes to groups of NCAA
violations).
21. NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, art. 19.5.1(e), 19.5.2(e) (stating lim-
ited reduction in number of financial aid awards to student-athletes as possible
sanction).  Over the past five years, scholarship reduction sanctions alone have cost
twelve major football programs a combined $7 million. See Rachael Bachman, The
Costly Toll of NCAA Sanctions, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2013, 12:14 PM), http://on-
line.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323419604578571512587696992.html.
22. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 19.5.2.3 (explaining sanctions
that are given to repeat offenders and defining repeat offenders as those who vio-
late NCAA Bylaws more than once every five years and explaining types of proba-
tion, forfeiture of financial aid to student-athletes, and other penalties).  The
NCAA has termed this penalty resulting in some form of probation as the “death
penalty.” See id. Critics of the “death penalty” point out the negative effects this
sanction had on SMU both on and off the field. See Chris Smith, Worse Punishment:
Penn State Sanctions or SMU Death Penalty? FORBES.COM (July 24, 2012, 11:39 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/07/24/worse-punishment-penn-
state-sanctions-or-smu-death-penalty/ (explaining that SMU lost revenue for two
football seasons and did not have a winning record for ten years after the death
penalty); see also Darren Rovell, SMU’s “Death Penalty”: What Price Did it Pay?, CNBC
(Jan. 8, 2008, 9:55 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/22553608 (“SMU has lost at
least $25 million over time from the death penalty.”).
23. See Rovell, supra note 22 (discussing suspension of SMU’s football pro-
gram and other sanctions after NCAA discovered SMU was paying football players
to compete).  The NCAA determined that thirteen football players received a total
6
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lesser sanctions such as the economic and corrective measures
Penn State University (PSU) received in 2012 following the Jerry
Sandusky scandal.24  Finally, the NCAA can also force member insti-
tutions to declare a student-athlete ineligible from competition and
require that student-athletes be withheld from competition unless
the NCAA’s reinstatement committee overturns the ineligibility de-
cision.25  For example, Ohio State University (OSU) withheld five
student-athletes from competing in the first five games of the 2010
season for selling OSU football memorabilia to a tattoo parlor in
exchange for cash and free tattoos.26
In some instances, such as in McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel
Hill,27 a student-athlete will turn to the courts for injunctive relief to
prevent enforcement of the NCAA’s ineligibility declaration, and to
of $47,000 during the 1985-86 academic year and that eight players received pay-
ments up until December 1986 that totaled $14,000. See SOUTHERN METHODIST
UNIVERSITY INFRACTIONS REPORT (1987), available at http://assets.sbnation.com/as-
sets/388698/SMU_COI_report.pdf.
24. See Binding Consent Decree Imposed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association
and Accepted by the Pennsylvania State University, NCAA.ORG (July 23, 2012), http://
www.ncaa.com/content/penn-state-conclusions (discussing facts and conclusions
of investigation as well as describing imposed sanctions).  In 2012 former defensive
coordinator, Jerry Sandusky, was found guilty of molesting ten boys over a fifteen
year period and many individuals within PSU were fired or resigned following alle-
gations that they knew of the child abuse but failed to inform authorities. See Penn
State Scandal, ESPN.COM (Feb. 12, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://espn.go.com/ncf/top-
ics/_/page/penn-state-scandal (providing overview of child abuse scandal at PSU).
As a result of the Jerry Sandusky scandal PSU was penalized with a $60 million fine,
a four-year postseason ban, four-year reduction in financial aid, five years of proba-
tion, vacation of wins by the football program from 1998-2011, and a waiver of
transfer rules. See id.  But see Scott Gleeson, NCAA to Gradually Restore Penn State
Scholarships, USATODAY.COM (Sept. 24, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/ncaaf/2013/09/24/ncaa-executive-committee-to-gradually-restore-
penn-state-scholarships/2860989/ (explaining that NCAA will gradually allow PSU
to offer more athletic scholarships to student-athletes beginning in 2014-2015
school year).  Critics of the NCAA’s sanctioning process also point out the negative
impacts sanctions, such as probation, have on innocent student-athletes and re-
cruits. See Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where it Belongs, 52
B.C. L. REV. 551, 565-68 (2011) (stating that NCAA sanctions are overly broad and
impact student-athletes who  were not involved in NCAA violations).
25. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 14.11.1 (“If a student-athlete is
ineligible under the provisions of the [C]onstitution, [B]ylaws, or other regula-
tions of the Association, the institution shall be obligated to apply immediately the
applicable rule to withhold the student-athlete from all intercollegiate competi-
tion.  The institution may appeal to the Committee on Student-Athlete Reinstate-
ment for restoration of the student-athlete’s eligibility.”); see also id. at art. 14.12
(explaining reinstatement process).
26. See Ohio State Football Players Sanctioned, ESPN.COM (Dec. 26, 2012, 10:01
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5950873 (explaining that
Terrelle Pryor and four other student-athletes were suspended for selling jerseys
and other memorabilia as well as allegedly receiving free tattoos, which violates
NCAA rules).
27. 736 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
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receive monetary damages for breach of contract.28  In McAdoo, a
football player at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
(UNC), filed suit after UNC declared him ineligible following accu-
sations of academic fraud and receipt of improper benefits.29  How-
ever, both the North Carolina trial court and appeals court
dismissed the case on the basis that McAdoo lacked standing to
bring any of these claims and that all claims were moot because
McAdoo had already entered into a professional contract with the
Baltimore Ravens.30  By dismissing the case on justiciability grounds
rather than addressing whether the NCAA had in fact violated McA-
doo’s rights, the court granted the NCAA tremendous judicial def-
erence, leaving future student-athletes, who have been unsuccessful
in internally appealing an NCAA decision, without a means of judi-
cial redress.31
This Note argues that the McAdoo decision creates a new bar-
rier to student-athlete claims against the NCAA, and proposes gui-
dance to help student-athletes in a claim against the NCAA when
student-athletes have been declared ineligible.32  Part II discusses
the factual and procedural underpinnings of the McAdoo case.33
Part III explains different approaches to litigation by student-ath-
letes who previously sued the NCAA.34  Part IV addresses how the
North Carolina Court of Appeals continued this deferential ap-
proach in McAdoo and describes the court’s failure to apply appro-
priate precedent in favor of granting continued judicial
28. See id. at 820 (discussing McAdoo’s claims against Defendants).
29. See id. (discussing McAdoo’s complaint filed in Durham County Superior
Court).
30. See id. (dismissing case for failure to meet justiciability standards).
31. See Joel Eckert, Note, Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of
Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV. 905, 913 (2006) (“[C]ourts have largely deferred
to NCAA action in cases brought by plaintiffs. As a result, student-athletes have met
with little success in bringing claims against the NCAA.”).
32. See generally Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala.
1979) (“The athlete himself has no voice or bargaining power concerning the
rules and regulations adopted by the athletic associations because he is not a mem-
ber, yet he stands to be substantially affected, and even damaged, by an association
ruling declaring him to be ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics.”).
In recent years, some courts have offered student-athletes the possibility to succeed
in contract claims against the NCAA. See, e.g., Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n., 93 P.3d 621, 623-24 (Col. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing how student-athletes
are intended to benefit from contracts between  NCAA and member institutions);
Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 920 N.E.2d 203, 215-16 (Ohio Ct. Com.
Pl. 2009) (finding in favor of student-athlete’s third-party beneficiary claim).
33. For a discussion of the facts surrounding the North Carolina Court of
Appeal’s holding in McAdoo, see infra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
34. For further discussion of the history of judicial deference toward the
NCAA by different jurisdictions, see infra notes 59-110 and accompanying text.
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deference.35  Part V discusses why McAdoo creates another barrier to
student-athlete claims against the NCAA across the country.36  Fi-
nally, Part VI explains how attorneys can attempt to overcome the
judicial deference reaffirmed in the McAdoo decision, in order to
succeed in future lawsuits against the NCAA.37
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE: MICHAEL MCADOO ATTEMPTS TO BLITZ
UNC AND THE NCAA
In 2008, Michael McAdoo enrolled at UNC, where he played
football during his freshman and sophomore years.38  Prior to com-
peting on the field, McAdoo agreed to abide by the NCAA’s regula-
tions and standards of conduct by signing the “Student-Athlete
Statement.”39  While at UNC, McAdoo received a football scholar-
ship as well as academic support and tutors from the University.40
In July 2009, McAdoo e-mailed a former tutor and asked her to
write a number of citations for a paper assigned to him  for one of
his classes.41  After his tutor completed the footnotes and a works
cited section, McAdoo submitted this final paper to his professor as
his own.42
The following year, UNC officials discovered this e-mail corre-
spondence while investigating McAdoo for an unrelated matter.43
35. For a discussion of how the McAdoo court addressed McAdoo’s claims
while granting deference to the NCAA infra notes 114-135 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the McAdoo court’s failure to apply appropriate precedent to
McAdoo’s claims, see infra notes 136-158 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the potential negative impacts of the McAdoo decision
on student-athlete claims, see infra notes 159-184 and accompanying text.
37. For an explanation of the potential impact of the McAdoo decision and
suggested arguments for practicing attorneys to distinguish McAdoo’s holding, see
infra notes 185-219 and accompanying text.
38. See McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 815 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013) (explaining that McAdoo accepted football scholarship from UNC and
played during 2008 and 2009 seasons).  UNC is a member of the Atlantic Coast
Conference and the National Collegiate Athletic Association. See id.
39. See id. at 815-16 (detailing relevant affirmations in Student-Athlete State-
ment regarding violations and player ineligibility); see also ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS,
supra note 12, at art. 30.12 (providing official text of Student-Athlete Statement).
40. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 815-16 (discussing McAdoo’s receipt of football
scholarship, room and board, and tutor through UNC’s Academic Support Pro-
gram).  Jennifer Wiley was McAdoo’s assigned tutor from fall 2008 until spring
2009 when Wiley stopped working for UNC’s tutoring center.  In the Spring of
2009, another tutor was subsequently assigned to McAdoo. See id. at 816.
41. See id. at 816 (providing email correspondence in which Wiley sent com-
pleted footnotes and works cited page to McAdoo who then submitted draft from
Wiley to his professor).
42. See id. (discussing Wiley’s role in completing McAdoo’s paper).
43. See id. at 816-17 (explaining that UNC read McAdoo’s email in response
to NCAA claims that UNC football players, including McAdoo, had received im-
9
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Concerned that the tutor’s assistance constituted academic fraud,
UNC submitted a hypothetical scenario to the NCAA’s Academic
and Membership Affairs Department (“AMA”) based on McAdoo’s
e-mail correspondence with his former tutor.44  The AMA deter-
mined that the conduct was unethical and in violation of a NCAA
Bylaw.45  Consequently, UNC reported the violation to the NCAA
and declared McAdoo ineligible to compete on September 2, 2010,
pending official investigations by the NCAA and the UNC Honor
Court.46
UNC subsequently filed a petition with the NCAA to have McA-
doo’s eligibility reinstated.47  Before the NCAA could come to a de-
cision regarding McAdoo’s eligibility, UNC’s student-led Honor
Court found McAdoo guilty of one charge of academic fraud.48  Ad-
ditionally, the Honor Court sanctioned him with academic proba-
tion for the Fall 2010 semester, suspension from classes for the
Spring 2011 semester, and a failing grade for submitting the work
of his tutor as his own assignment.49  The NCAA went further than
UNC’s Honor Court, declaring McAdoo permanently ineligible
proper benefits from sports agents).  The NCAA investigation began as a result of
allegations that a sports agent had paid for McAdoo and two fellow student-ath-
letes to stay in a hotel for two nights and paid McAdoo’s cover charge at a night
club, totaling $110 in improper benefits. See Darren Heitner, Michael McAdoo Sues
UNC, NCAA to Restore Eligibility, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (July 6, 2013), http://www
.sportsagentblog.com/2011/07/06/michael-mcadoo-sues-unc-ncaa-to-restore-eligi-
bility/ (providing background information regarding McAdoo’s lawsuit against
UNC and NCAA).
44. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 817 (stating that UNC submitted Wiley’s assis-
tance to McAdoo as theoretical scenario to determine if any violations of NCAA
regulations had occurred).  The NCAA encourages member institutions to inform
the NCAA of potential infractions by considering such self-disclosure as a “mitigat-
ing factor in determining the penalty” to be imposed upon the school by the en-
forcement staff. See ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 12, at art. 32.2.1.2
(discussing how self-disclosure is to be viewed favorably when levying penalties for
infractions).
45. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 817 (explaining how AMA staff determined hy-
pothetical regarding Wiley and McAdoo’s conduct violated NCAA Bylaw 10.1(b)).
46. See id. (noting that UNC fulfilled its obligation as NCAA member to de-
clare McAdoo ineligible based on its suspicion of academic fraud).
47. See id. at 817-18 (citing UNC’s Athletic Director’s reinstatement petition
to NCAA’s Director of Student-Athlete Reinstatement, arguing that McAdoo was
unaware help he received from his school-appointed tutor was inappropriate).
48. See id. at 818 (discussing UNC Honor Court’s decision finding McAdoo
guilty of one honor code violation).
49. See id. (discussing UNC Honor Court’s sanctions).  After McAdoo filed
suit in Durham County Superior Court, it was discovered that McAdoo had also
plagiarized parts of the paper from an online source; however, that information
was not part of the evidence used by the NCAA in ruling McAdoo ineligible from
future competition. See Andy Staples, Plagiarism Discovery Complicates McAdoo’s Case
against UNC, NCAA, SI.COM (July 8, 2011, 3:11 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn
.com/2011/writers/andy_staples/07/08/unc-ncaa-michael-mcadoo/index.html.
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from competing in intercollegiate football for committing three
counts of academic fraud and receiving extra benefits.50  Due to a
dispute of facts regarding whether McAdoo had committed aca-
demic fraud, UNC appealed the NCAA’s decision pursuant to the
NCAA’s internal appeal procedures, but the NCAA affirmed its inel-
igibility decision.51  Because of his ineligibility, McAdoo decided to
enter the National Football League’s (NFL) supplemental draft,
went undrafted, and eventually signed a contract as a free agent
with the Baltimore Ravens.52  By signing this professional contract,
McAdoo was no longer an amateur athlete and was thereafter ineli-
gible to compete in collegiate football.53
On July 1, 2011, McAdoo filed suit against UNC, the Univer-
sity’s Chancellor, and the NCAA alleging breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, negligence, libel, tortious interference with con-
tract, and state constitutional violations.54  McAdoo based his alle-
50. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 818 (referencing NCAA Student-Athlete Rein-
statement Case Report, which states McAdoo is permanently ineligible due to viola-
tions of NCAA Bylaws 10.1(b), 12.3.1.2, 16.02.3, and 16.11.2.1).  For a discussion of
the allegations of extra benefits received by McAdoo, see supra note 43 and accom-
panying text.
51. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 818-19 (discussing NCAA appeal procedure and
evidence presented during appeal hearing, which resulted in decision to reaffirm
McAdoo’s ineligibility).  The NCAA refused to accept the contention that McAdoo
made a good faith mistake, but rather, the NCAA determined that McAdoo delib-
erately intended to commit academic fraud when he emailed his former tutor,
whom he knew would help him, as opposed to emailing his newly assigned tutor.
See id.  In reaching this decision, the NCAA concluded that there was no dispute
McAdoo had committed multiple counts of academic fraud even though the UNC
Honor Court had only found him guilty of one count. See id.; see also Michael McA-
doo’s Reinstatement Denied, ESPN.COM (July 13, 2011, 7:36 PM), http://espn.go
.com/college-football/story/_/id/6767022/judge-denies-north-carolina-tar-heels-
michael-mcadoo-reinstatement-bid (explaining McAdoo’s argument that NCAA’s
decision was based on inaccurate).
52. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 819 (noting McAdoo was not drafted in supple-
ment draft but did sign contract with Baltimore Ravens for $270,000 per year); see
also Terry McCormick, Ravens Grab McAdoo After Supplemental Draft, NAT’L FOOT-
BALL POST (Aug. 23,2011, 9:30 AM), http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/Ravens-
grab-McAdoo-after-supplemental-draft.html (“Michael McAdoo didn’t get picked
in the supplemental draft on Monday, but once it was over, it didn’t take him long
to find a landing spot.”).
53. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 819-820 (citing NCAA Bylaw 12.2.5 as additional
basis for McAdoo’s ineligibility); see also OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art.
12.2.5 (“An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate
sport if he or she has entered into any kind of agreement to compete in profes-
sional athletics, either orally or in writing, regardless of the legal enforceability of
that agreement.”).
54. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 820 (discussing McAdoo’s complaint filed in
Durham County Superior Court). See generally Complaint, Michael McAdoo v.
Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2011) (No. 11 CVS
3903), 2011 WL 8363727.  While UNC’s Chancellor, Holden Thorp, was also
named as a defendant in McAdoo’s lawsuit, this Note does not distinguish Thorp
11
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gations on the premise that he was a “gifted” athlete who could
have developed additional skills  and become a prospective selec-
tion in the 2012 NFL Draft if the Defendants had not prevented
him from playing football his senior year at UNC.55  However, the
Superior Court disagreed with McAdoo and granted the Defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss for failure to meet justiciability grounds.56
McAdoo decided to appeal the Superior Court’s decision.57  The
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismis-
sal, holding that McAdoo lacked standing because his injuries were
speculative and his claims were moot.58
III. BACKGROUND
Generally, both state and federal courts refuse to intervene in
the affairs of the NCAA, regardless of the subject matter, unless the
NCAA’s actions are arbitrary or capricious.59  Consequently, law-
suits against the NCAA typically fail to pass the necessary threshold
question, which effectively exempts the NCAA from suit.60  How-
ever, recent decisions by state courts have held that student-athletes
may succeed in bringing a claim against the NCAA for a breach of
contract between a member institution and the NCAA.61
individually from UNC since the court analyzed his claims in conjunction with the
claims against UNC.
55. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d 820 (discussing McAdoo’s allegations); see also
Michael McAdoo’s Reinstatement Denied, supra note 51 (explaining McAdoo’s argu-
ment that he was being denied opportunity to play college football as well as possi-
bility to sign more lucrative professional football contract).
56. See McAdoo, 736 S.E. 2d at 820 (stating lower court’s decision to dismiss
case).
57. See id. (noting McAdoo’s decision to file timely appeal).
58. See id. (holding that McAdoo’s claims failed to meet two subsets of doc-
trine of justiciability).
59. For a discussion of the judicial deference given to the NCAA and the lim-
ited scope of judicial review, see infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Arlosoroff v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1020-
21 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that plaintiff must demonstrate that private action
is “fairly attributable to the state” in order to be considered state action, which is
subject to constitutional limitations); Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F.
Supp. 95, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (“A threshold question is whether the Sherman Act
reaches the actions of [NCAA] members in setting eligibility standards for intercol-
legiate athletics. On the basis of the existing record, this court concludes that it
does not.”); Matthews v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205-
06 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (determining NCAA was not subject to suit under Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) because NCAA did not operate any public accommoda-
tion). But see Tatum v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (finding that NCAA operates place of public accommodation for
purposes of Title III of ADA to enable decision based on merits of case).
61. See generally Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 93 P.3d 621 (Col. Ct.
App. 2004) (finding that student-athletes are intended third-party beneficiaries);
12
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A. Protecting the NCAA’s Blind Side: Using Judicial Deference
to Shield the NCAA from Lawsuits
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held
that private organizations have the right to establish and interpret
their own rules.62  However, courts will intervene if a private organi-
zation violates or erroneously interprets its established rules.63  The
NCAA has benefited from repeated instances of judicial deference
based on its status as a private, voluntary organization.64  Courts
have also granted the NCAA deference because of the organiza-
tion’s status as an educational organization.65  Notwithstanding that
Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009)
(holding that student-athletes may sue for breach of contract as third-party benefi-
ciaries to contract between NCAA and its members).
62. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (explaining
that courts grant deference to private organizations to make internal decisions).
63. See Schultz v. U.S. Boxing Ass’n., 105 F.3d 127, 135-36 (1997) (affirming
right of private organization to set its own rules, but approving court intervention
when organization violates its own rules) (citing Rutledge v. Gulian, 459 A.2d 680
(N.J. 1983)).  In Rutledge, the court established the standard of review to allow for
the invalidation of a private organization’s decision only when (1) the plaintiff’s
interest is sufficient to warrant judicial action, and (2) that the defendant’s action
violates public policy or fundamental fairness. See id.; see also Gulf South Confer-
ence v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979) (sanctioning judicial review of any
fraudulent, collusive, or arbitrary association action).
64. See, e.g., Shelton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198
(9th Cir. 1976) (“It is not judicial business to tell a voluntary athletic association
how best to formulate or enforce its rules.”); Cole v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1071-72 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (“The NCAA’s rules and decisions
regarding the concerns and challenges of student-athletes are entitled to consider-
able deference and this court is reluctant to replace the NCAA subcommittee as
the decision-maker”); Bloom, 93 P.3d at 626 (“Any ambiguity in NCAA [B]ylaws
would have been enforced according to how the NCAA – not the court – inter-
preted them.”); 6 AM. JUR. 2D, Associations and Clubs § 8 (1963) (stating associa-
tion’s right to administer its own rules without judicial intervention); see generally
Russell W. Szwabowski, The Federal Courts Have Given the NCAA Back Its Home Court
Advantage, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 29, 30 (1989) (explaining how federal courts and
U.S. Supreme Court have “severely and permanently restricted access to judicial
fora for plaintiffs who wanted to bring suit against the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) for fourteenth amendment violations”). But see Boyd, 369
So.2d at 557 (Ala. 1979) (“We hold that the general non-interference doctrine
concerning voluntary associations does not apply to cases involving disputes be-
tween college athletes themselves and college athletic associations.”).
65. See Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir.
1992) (upholding NCAA’s “No-Draft” rule in football to prevent “profit making
objectives . . . [from] overshadow[ing] educational objectives”); see also Justice, 577
F. Supp. at 371-72 (“[P]laintiffs’ interests . . . must give way to the NCAA’s broader
interests in maintaining intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educa-
tional program and preserving the amateur nature of the college sport.”); Alfred
Dennis Mathewson, The Eligibility Paradox, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 87 (2000)
(discussing NCAA’s claim that it should be granted deference because of its educa-
tional nexus). But see Hennessy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F.2d 1136,
13
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fact, courts have at times been willing to intervene in cases where
the NCAA has acted arbitrarily and capriciously.66
B. Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Court
Decisions “Sack” Student-Athlete Anti-Trust Claims
Against the NCAA
In order to succeed in an anti-trust claim against the NCAA, a
student-athlete must demonstrate sufficient facts to show that the
NCAA is a “commercial enterprise” and that the NCAA’s actions
have an anti-competitive effect.67  While the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the NCAA’s sole control of television rights
was a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (“Sherman Act”), the
Third Circuit has held that the NCAA’s rules and regulations relat-
ing to student-athletes do not violate the Sherman Act.68  The Su-
preme Court established that suits brought under Section One of
the Sherman Act must demonstrate that the wrongful conduct cre-
ates an unreasonable “restraint on trade or commerce.”69  There-
1148-49 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that NCAA should not be granted “blanket”
deference).
66. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Ky. 2001)
(stating that student-athletes should be able to challenge arbitrary decisions by
NCAA that render student-athlete ineligible); see also Boyd, 369 So.2d at 557 (hold-
ing that court’s standard “non-interference doctrine” should not apply to claims
between student-athletes and private athletic associations because “[t]he athlete
himself has no voice or bargaining power concerning the rules and regulations
adopted by the athletic associations because he is not a member, yet he stands to
be substantially affected, and even damaged, by an association ruling declaring
him to be ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics.”). But see Phillip v.
Fairfield Univ., 118 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1997) (establishing higher burden for
student-athletes by holding that under Connecticut law, failure to demonstrate
good faith is not enough, but rather, NCAA must exhibit bad faith or dishonest
purpose in order for court to invalidate NCAA actions).
67. See Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes,
and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS.
L. REV. 545, 584-85 (1995) (analyzing background information of student-athlete
anti-trust claims against NCAA).
68. Compare Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (finding in favor of universities by holding that NCAA’s
television plan violated Sherman Act), with Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (dismissing student-athlete’s claim that NCAA’s
enforcement of rules and regulations violates Sherman Act).
69. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1911)
(“There can be no doubt that the sole subject with which [Section 1] deals is re-
straint of trade as therein contemplated, and that the attempt to monopolize and
monopolization is the subject with which the 2nd section is concerned.”).
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fore, the NCAA will only be subject to Sherman Act when the
NCAA’s actions or policies are purely commercial.70
In 1984, a group of member institutions sued the NCAA over
television rights to air football games in National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents.71  These universities claimed that the
NCAA’s sole control of television rights resulted in price fixing and
output limitation, which violated the Sherman Act.72  The Court ac-
knowledged that, “as guardian of an important American tradition,
the NCAA’s motives must be accorded a respectful presumption of
validity.”73  However, the Court held that the NCAA’s television
plan restrained both price and output; therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the NCAA had violated the Sherman Act.74  While this
decision was a huge win for universities, the Supreme Court noted
that ineligible student-athletes would not have the same success in
challenging the NCAA under the Sherman Act because a claim re-
garding eligibility is distinct from a claim regarding television
rights.75
In R.M. Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,76 the United States
Court of Appeals for Third Circuit extended the decision of Board
of Regents to create an explicit barrier to suits by student-athletes
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.77  In Smith, a student-athlete,
70. See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 85 (analyzing NCAA’s actions of
creating horizontal price ceiling for television rights to determine if this NCAA
practice constituted violation of Sherman Act).
71. See id. at 91 (explaining how NCAA developed plan to determine which
college football games to air on television in order to maximize game attendance,
resulting in lawsuit by universities to gain control of television rights).
72. See id. at 100 (discussing nature of claim against NCAA).  See generally Su-
san Marie Kozik, Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Re-
gents of the University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia Athletic Association
104 S.CT. 2948 (1984), 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 593 (1985) (discussing majority and
dissenting opinions as well as Court’s overall analysis of anti-trust claim).
73. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 n.23 (explaining judicial deference given
to NCAA); see also id. at 117 (“It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory
controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among ama-
teur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public in-
terest in intercollegiate athletics.”).
74. See id. at 113 (“[T]he NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a re-
straint upon the operation of a free market, and the findings of the District Court
establish that it has operated to raise prices and reduce output.”).
75. See id. at 117 (distinguishing claim regarding football telecasts with claims
related to contest, eligibility, and membership responsibility rules and regulations
of NCAA).
76. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
77. See Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.
1998), aff’d, 525 U.S. 459 (1990) (dismissing anti-trust claim on basis that NCAA
Bylaw was reasonably related to NCAA’s goal of preserving amateurism and pro-
moting fair competition).
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Renee Smith, applied for a waiver from the NCAA Graduate Trans-
fer Rule, which renders a student-athlete ineligible to compete at a
graduate university that is different from the student-athlete’s un-
dergraduate school unless the undergraduate school does not offer
the graduate program the student-athlete is pursuing.78  After the
NCAA refused to grant Smith a waiver to play at a different gradu-
ate school, Smith brought suit against the NCAA, alleging that the
NCAA Graduate Transfer Rule violated the Sherman Act and Title
IX.79
Generally, Smith asserted that the Sherman Act should not be
limited to the NCAA’s commercial and business activities, but it
should instead include any anti-competitive practices.80  The Third
Circuit disagreed with Smith and held that the Sherman Act does
not apply to the NCAA’s eligibility requirement because the
NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility requirements is not a commer-
cial activity.81  Additionally, the Smith court acknowledged that even
if the NCAA’s eligibility rules were subject to the Sherman Act, the
policies were not inherently unreasonable or anticompetitive.82  Ul-
timately, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of
Smith’s anti-trust claim against the NCAA.83  The Supreme Court of
78. See id. at 463-64 (detailing how Smith attempted to obtain waiver to play
while enrolled in graduate courses at both Hofstra University and University of
Pittsburgh concurrently); see also Get the Facts about Transfers, supra note 7 (“Stu-
dent-athletes who have graduated are subject to the same release requirements as
undergraduates . . . .  If the student-athlete wishes to pursue a degree program not
offered at the original institution, he or she is eligible for a waiver to compete
immediately at the new school.”).
79. See Smith, 139 F.3d at 184 (“Smith alleged that the Postbaccalaureate By-
law is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and the NCAA’s refusal to waive the bylaw excluded her from intercollegiate
competition based upon her sex in violation of Title IX.”).
80. See id. (“Count I of Smith’s complaint alleges that the NCAA, in promul-
gating and enforcing the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw, violated section 1 of the Sher-
man Act because the bylaw unreasonably restrains trade and has an adverse
anticompetitive effect.”).
81. See Smith, 139 F.3d at 184-85 (rejecting Smith’s arguments as legally invalid
and determining that NCAA’s character is not commercial activity).
82. See id. at 186 (explaining that if NCAA’s eligibility rules were subject to
Sherman Act, court would “analyze them under the rule of reason,” which entails
looking at relevant factors to determine reason and effect of policies).
83. See id. at 187 (“[W]e think that the [B]ylaw so clearly survives a rule of
reason analysis that we do not hesitate upholding it by affirming an order granting
a motion to dismiss Smith’s antitrust count for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.”); cf. Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp.
738, 747 (D. Md. 1990) (“[T]he Rules are overwhelmingly procompetitive, are jus-
tified by legitimate business reasons, and consequently cannot be viewed as having
any unreasonably exclusionary or anticompetitive effect.”); Banks v. Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (upholding eligibility
rules under  Section One of Sherman Act); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
16
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the United States refused to grant certiorari on Smith’s anti-trust
claim, which rendered the Third Circuit’s holding on the matter
final.84
C. Finding that the NCAA Is Not a “Stiff Arm”
of the Government
1. Requirement that the NCAA Must be a State Actor to Succeed in Due
Process Claims
In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States enhanced the
NCAA’s control over student-athletes and member institutions by
decreasing the ability to succeed in judicial challenges against the
NCAA.85  In Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian,86 the Court
determined that the NCAA is not a state actor and is therefore not
required to provide members and student-athletes with constitu-
tional due process.87  In Tarkanian, the men’s head basketball
coach at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), sued UNLV
and the NCAA after UNLV suspended him because of NCAA sanc-
Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding NCAA eligibility rules were reasona-
ble and did not violate Section 1 of Sherman Act).
84. See Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 525 U.S. 872 (1998) (denying
certiorari).
85. See Michael G. Dawson, Comment, National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion v. Tarkanian: Supreme Court Upholds NCAA’s Private Status Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Repelling Shark’s Attack on NCAA’s Disciplinary Powers, 17 PEPP. L. REV.
217, 222 (1989) (“[T]he recent Supreme Court decision in National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, upholding the NCAA’s status as a private actor
under the fourteenth amendment, should pave the way toward increasing
the NCAA’s control over its members and decreasing the number of judicial chal-
lenges to its authority.”).
86. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
87. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 (1988) (determining that NCCA is indepen-
dent of any state and established rules in manual are rules of collective members
only); see also, e.g., Arlosoroff v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021
(4th Cir. 1984) (holding that NCAA ineligibility rule did not involve state action
even though half of NCAA’s membership and revenues come from public universi-
ties); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1347 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding “the
NCAA is not the state or a state agency and hence does not act under color of law
within the meaning of § 1983” of the United States Code). But see, Bloom v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Col. Ct. App. 2004) (acknowledging
that judicial review should be available when NCAA takes on role of “quasi-state
actor”) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83 n.9 (Ky.
2001)).  In Lasege, the court drew an analogy between the NCAA and a state high
school athletic association, the latter whose actions were subject to review because
of its role toward student-athletes. See id. (“[T]he [NCAA] occupies the role of a
quasi-state actor with respect to individual student-athletes”); see also, e.g., Cohane
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 215 F. App’x 13, 15-6 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding
that District Court was incorrect in “[interpreting] Tarkanian as holding categori-
cally that the NCAA can never be a state actor when it conducts an investigation of
a state school”).
17
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tions alleging improper recruiting practices.88  The Court acknowl-
edged that in certain circumstances a private organization could
become a state actor if a member institution delegates such author-
ity; however, in Tarkanian the court did not find that UNLV had
delegated the appropriate authority to the NCAA.89  Because the
NCAA was not a state actor, the Tarkanian decision insulates the
NCAA from due process challenges, allowing the organization to
encroach upon the constitutional rights of student-athletes and
member institutions.90
2. Requirement that the NCAA Must Receive Federal Funding to
Succeed Under Title IX
Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Third
Circuit have held that the NCAA is not subject to suit under federal
statutes because the NCAA does not receive federal funding.91  For
example, in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. R.M. Smith,92 the Plaintiff
brought suit under Title IX and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act after
the NCAA refused to grant her a waiver to play at a graduate school
different from her undergraduate school.93  Ultimately, the Su-
88. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 180-81 (1988) (explaining factual background
that lead former UNLV men’s basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian, to bring suit
against UNLV and NCAA).
89. See id. at 194 (determining that NCAA was not acting under color of Ne-
vada state law because UNLV retained ability to leave organization and establish
own rules). But see John P. Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: What’s Left
After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct.
454 (1988)?, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621, 623 (1989) (“[M]ost experts [agree] that there is
no viable alternative to the NCAA for successfully marketing athletic programs.”).
The court also left open the possibility that student-athletes could succeed in simi-
lar suits against different athletic associations.  See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194 n.13
(“The situation would, of course, be different if the membership consisted entirely
of institutions located within the same State, many of them public institutions cre-
ated by the same sovereign.”).
90. See Wintehn K.T. Park, Comment, National Collegiate Athletic Association
v. Tarkanian: The End of Judicial Review of the NCAA, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 383, 383-84
(1990) (discussing how to bring suit against NCAA under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and
explaining potential impact of Tarkanian). But see Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Paula
Alexander Becker, Is It Time to Revisit the Doctrine of State Action in the Context of
Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Sports?, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 191, 224-26
(2007) (explaining possibility that United States Supreme Court could adopt dis-
sent from Tarkanian and find that NCAA is state actor when acting jointly with
public university or college).
91. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. R.M. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 462
(1990) (preventing suit under Title IX); Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
No. Civ.A. 97–131, 1997 WL 634376, at *2 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 9, 1997) (dismissing Title
IX claim against NCAA).
92. 525 U.S. 459 (1990).
93. For a discussion of the factual underpinnings of the Smith case, see supra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.  Title IX states: “no person in the United
18
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preme Court of the United States rejected Smith’s argument that
the NCAA indirectly received federal funds because it benefited ec-
onomically from member institutions who directly receive federal
funds.94  On the other hand, the Court indicated two alternative
arguments that may have succeeded: 1) the NCAA receives federal
funding through the National Youth Sports Program (NYSP), or 2)
an organization that assumes control of a federally funded pro-
gram, is subject to Title IX even if the organization does not receive
federal funds directly.95  Since Smith failed to raise either of these
arguments, the Supreme Court found in favor of the NCAA.
In Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,96 the Third Circuit
extended the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith by finding that be-
cause the NCAA is not a recipient of federal funding, a student-
athlete cannot succeed in a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.97  The Plaintiffs in Cureton were African-American stu-
dents-athletes who alleged that the NCAA’s initial eligibility require-
ments, which prevented them from competing their freshman year,
had an unjustified disparate impact on African-American student-
athletes.98  While the Plaintiffs argued that the NCAA received fed-
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance.”  20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1994).
94. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 462 (holding that acceptance of membership dues
from institutions that receive federal funding is not enough to determine that
NCAA also receives federal funding).  The Plaintiff in Smith also raised an anti-trust
claim; however, the Court did not review that issue on appeal. See id. at 464 n.2.
For further discussion of the district court’s dismissal of the anti-trust claim see
supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. R
95. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 469-70 (presenting arguments that may support con-
tention that NCAA receives federal funds).  The Court cited two district court cases
that supported the argument that the NCAA could be subject to suit under Title
IX because of the National Youth Sports Program. See id. at 469 (citing Bowers v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 494 (D.N.J. 1998)), aff’d, 118 F.
Supp. 2d 527 (2000) (stating that “there are genuine questions of material fact as
to whether the NCAA receives federal funds through the NYSPF or whether the
NCAA is intertwined with the NYSPF such that it cannot be considered separate”);
see also Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. Civ.A. 97–131, 1997 WL
634376, at *2 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 9, 1997) (dismissing Title IX claim against NCAA but
explaining that if facts demonstrated that “the National Youth Sports Program
fund is nothing more than a sham to disguise the NCAA’s use of federal funds for
its own benefit, then the NCAA does receive federal financial assistance”).
96. 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
97. See id. at 118 (dismissing case against NCAA on grounds that NCAA does
not receive federal funding).  Title VI states “no person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
98. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 111-12 (discussing plaintiffs arguments against
NCAA).
19
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eral funding though the NYSP, the Circuit Court determined that
Title VI is “program specific” and cannot be applied to the NCAA
organization as a whole.99  Consequently, student-athletes can only
bring a claim under Title VI against NCAA programs that directly
receive federal funding.100
D. Turnover on Downs: District Courts Give Student-Athletes
the Opportunity to Succeed in Contract Claims
Against the NCAA
Two District Court decisions have allowed student-athletes to
succeed in contract claims against the NCAA.101  In Bloom v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,102 the Plaintiff, an Olympic skier who re-
ceived a number of endorsement deals, including a modeling con-
tract with Tommy Hilfiger, sued the NCAA after it required him to
choose between playing football at the University of Colorado and
continuing these endorsement deals.103  The Colorado Court of
Appeals refused to issue an injunction enjoining enforcement of
the NCAA’s rule against Bloom, holding that the rules involved
were rationally related to the NCAA’s core purpose of protecting
amateurism and that the rules were not applied arbitrarily or capri-
ciously.104  Despite this final decision, the court also recognized
that student-athletes have standing to sue the NCAA as third-party
beneficiaries to a contract between the NCAA and member institu-
99. See id. at 115 (“[I]t is obvious that a recipient of Federal financial assis-
tance need not give an assurance of nondiscrimination with respect to programs in
no way affecting the Federally assisted program.”).
100. See Douglas Bryant, Comment, A Level Playing Field? The NCAA’s Freshman
Eligibly Standards Violate Title VI, But the Problems Can Be Solved, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV.
305, 345 (2001) (“[T]he regulations, which, unlike Title VI[,] include disparate
impact provisions, by their terms remain program specific. It therefore inexorably
follows that, to the extent this action is predicated on the NCAA’s receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance by reason of grants to the Fund, it must fail as the Fund’s
programs and activities are not in issue in this case.”).
101. See Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual Curveball at
the NCAA’s “Veil of Amateurism,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 190 (2010) (“The Bloom
decision, although decided in favor of the NCAA, presented opportunities for
cases like Oliver v. NCAA to be meaningfully heard because of its recognition that
student-athletes have standing to challenge NCAA regulations through a third-
party contract analysis.”).
102. 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
103. See id. at 622 (explaining that Bloom competed in Olympic and profes-
sional World Cup skiing events, which lead to many endorsement deals but Bloom
also wished to compete in collegiate football at University of Colorado, where he
had received athletic scholarship).
104. See id. at 628 (explaining that  rule which prevents student-athlete from
collecting endorsements is related to promotion of amateurism in college sports).
20
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tions.105  Consequently, Bloom is a useful tool to future student-ath-
lete claims against the NCAA because it gives student-athletes
standing to sue the NCAA for money damages for foreseeable losses
based on material obligations owed.106
In Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,107 the Court of Com-
mon Pleas in Erie County, Ohio came to the same determina-
tion.108  However, unlike Bloom, the Oliver Court determined that
the two NCAA rules involved violated good faith and fair dealing,
and therefore, the court granted an injunction to prevent the
NCAA from enforcing those rules.109  Ultimately, the court vacated
the holding after the NCAA agreed to pay Oliver a $750,000 settle-
ment agreement in order to reinstitute both of these rules.110
105. See id. at 623-24 (discussing how student-athletes are intended to be ben-
efited by contract between  NCAA and member institutions).  A third party benefi-
ciary “may have a right to sue on the contract where (a) the performance of the
promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee . . . or (b) the circumstances
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the prom-
ised performance.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
106. See Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play: The Jeremy Bloom Decision and
NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 690
(2003) (defining parameters of third-party beneficiary theory and explaining that
third-party beneficiary has proper standing to sue NCAA and University for inju-
ries sustained due to breach of contract). But cf. Hairston v. PAC-10, 101 F.3d
1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding student-athletes were not to be intended bene-
ficiaries to contract between high school conference and its school).
107. 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
108. See id. at 211 (acknowledging that agreement between Oklahoma State
University and NCAA was intended to benefit student-athletes granting student-
athletes third-party beneficiary status).  Oliver was declared ineligible to play base-
ball for Oklahoma State University during his junior year of college after a law firm
Oliver had previously met with complained to the NCAA that Oliver may have
violated amateurism rules. Id. at 206-07.  The NCAA Bylaw states “a lawyer may not
be present during discussions of a contract offer with a professional organization
or have any direct contact . . . with a professional sports organization on behalf of
the individual.  A lawyer’s presence during such discussions is considered repre-
sentation by an agent.” OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 12.3.2.1; see also
John T. Wolohan, NCAA Rule Intended to Protect Student-Athletes Does Opposite, Court
Says, ATHLETIC BUS. (June 2009), http://www.athleticbusiness.com/articles/arti-
cle.aspx?articleid=2194&zoneid=30 (explaining NCAA Bylaw that prevents attor-
ney presence at negotiations and how Ohio court addressed issues of Oliver case).
109. See Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 215-16 (explaining how No Agent Rule hinders
student-athlete’s representation to legal counsel and that restitution rule is arbi-
trary); see also Hall v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 985 F. Supp. 782, 796-97
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (“There can be no doubt that an important function of the NCAA
and its Constitution, Bylaws, and regulations, is to benefit student athletes.  It is not
clear, however that this fact is sufficient to elevate a student from an incidental to
an intended beneficiary.”). But cf. Hairston, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to infer that the PAC-10 Conference’s Constitution or Bylaws “intended
to assume a direct contractual obligation to every football player on a PAC-10
team”).
110. Parties’ Settlement Agreement, Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 920
N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 8, 2009) (No. 2008-CV-0762), available at
21
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IV. ANALYSIS
The North Carolina Court of Appeals’ decision in McAdoo dis-
missed a student-athlete’s ability to challenge successfully the en-
forcement of the NCAA’s ineligibility rules.111  The court addressed
McAdoo’s claims against UNC and the NCAA individually and ulti-
mately determined that McAdoo failed to raise a justiciable contro-
versy against either defendant.112  This decision will have negative
effects on student-athletes who are deemed ineligible to compete
because the availability of a judicial challenge to the NCAA’s au-
thority has greatly decreased.113
A. Narrative Analysis: North Carolina Court of Appeals Affirms
Dismissal of McAdoo’s Claims
McAdoo brought several contract claims against UNC under
the Athletics Scholarship Agreement (the “Agreement”), which out-
lines the conditions of a student-athlete’s scholarship, and the In-
strument of Student Judicial Governance (the “Instrument”), which
dictates the internal process for addressing UNC Honor Code viola-
tions.114  McAdoo also claimed that the NCAA violated its internal
rules and acted arbitrarily in determining that certain violations of
academic fraud had occurred and that McAdoo had knowingly
committed those violations.115  The court in McAdoo noted that the
procedures of UNC are independent of the NCAA even though
both organizations prohibit some of the same conduct; therefore,
the court reviewed claims against UNC and the NCAA separately.116
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/12908872/Andy-Oliver-Settlement-Terms (outlin-
ing terms of settlement agreement).  “Even though the decision has now been
vacated by the settlement, this wide-sweeping proclamation by Judge Tone indi-
cates that Oliver v. NCAA could be strike one to the NCAA’s [N]o [A]gent rules.”
Lockhart, supra note 101, at 197 (explaining Oliver will still have positive effects for R
student-athletes despite order being vacated due to settlement).
111. See McAdoo v. Univ. N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 815 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013) (dismissing all claims and leaving McAdoo without any means of legal
redress).
112. See id. at 826 (concluding McAdoo did not meet necessary justiciability
requirements).
113. See Bianchi & Gadol, supra note 19, at 152 (acknowledging that NCAA’s
sole control over college athletics creates potential for abuse and leaves student-
athletes and universities without any power to overcome NCAA sanctions).
114. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 820 (listing McAdoo’s claims for breach of con-
tract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, libel, tortuous interference with con-
tract, and state constitutional violations against UNC).
115. See id. at 825 (introducing three claims against NCAA).
116. See id. at 825-26 (explaining standards that NCAA is required to provide
student-athletes as private organization differ from requirements UNC is required
to provide as public university).
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1. Claims against UNC
In looking at McAdoo’s claim under the Agreement, the McA-
doo court accepted that the Agreement between McAdoo and UNC
constituted an express contract for full financial aid while McAdoo
was a student-athlete at UNC.117  However, UNC never terminated
McAdoo’s athletic scholarship, even after the NCAA declared McA-
doo ineligible.118  Consequently, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals stated that the claim for breach of the Agreement was
appropriately dismissed based on McAdoo’s failure to present a
prima facie case.119  Furthermore, the court refused to accept McA-
doo’s allegation that the existence of “special damages” established
the elements necessary for a breach of the Agreement.120  McAdoo
argued that UNC breached the Agreement by preventing him from
playing football his senior year, which reduced McAdoo’s subse-
quent earnings as a professional football player.121  The court relied
on North Carolina precedent, which held a court should reject a
“claim for special damages by a disappointed student-athlete” as too
speculative.122  Ultimately, the court in McAdoo followed this prece-
dent which justified dismissing McAdoo’s claim for special
damages.123
Moreover, the court also noted that a plaintiff’s actions follow-
ing the filing of a lawsuit could render the litigation moot, which
117. See id. at 820-21 (reviewing terms of ASA between UNC and McAdoo).
In North Carolina, a contract-based claim requires a showing of a bargained-for
loss.  See id. at 821 (citing Beachcomber Props., L.L.C. v. Station One, Inc., 611
S.E.2d 191, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)) (explaining contractual claim only exists if
plaintiff can show damages).
118. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 821 (explaining nothing in record indicates
UNC ever terminated McAdoo’s scholarship).
119. See id. at 821 (“[W]e conclude Plaintiff cannot show any bargained-for
monetary loss under the ASA which is attributable to the acts of UNC or Thorp.”).
120. See id. at 822 (stating McAdoo’s contention that damages should not be
limited to loss of scholarship money is not persuasive).
121. See id. (explaining McAdoo’s claim that UNC’s actions directly caused
him to earn less money as free agent in NFL than he would have earned if he had
been drafted after playing his senior year, as he anticipated).
122. See id. (holding McAdoo’s claims are too speculative and hypothetical to
withstand motion to dismiss) (quoting Arendas v. N.C. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
718 S.E.2d 198 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)).  In Arendas, the court held that students did
not have standing to bring suit because their claims for special damages were all
hypothetical. See Arendas, 718 S.E.2d at 198 (affirming dismissal of claims).  The
court in McAdoo also cited decisions from other courts that similarly held that dam-
ages to an interest in future career as a professional athlete are too speculative to
afford relief. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 822 (discussing non-binding authority that
came to similar decision).
123. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 822 (“Like in Arendas, we determine Plaintiff’s
alleged damages are too hypothetical and speculative to survive a motion to
dismiss.”).
23
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means that the matter has been resolved extra-judicially, or the mat-
ter has come to an end before the time of judicial review.124  While
the lawsuit was pending, McAdoo had signed a contract to become
a professional football player and therefore, the court determined
that McAdoo’s claims had become moot.125  While the court dis-
cussed the question of mootness along with its analysis of McAdoo’s
claim, the court held that all claims against both UNC and the
NCAA were moot because McAdoo had achieved his goal of becom-
ing a professional athlete.126
Finally, the court addressed McAdoo’s claims that UNC failed
to follow its internal procedures as outlined in the Instrument by
prematurely reporting the allegation of academic fraud to the
NCAA.127  The court recognized that as a public university, UNC
was obligated to follow due process requirements established in the
Instrument when bringing proceedings against a student.128  How-
ever, the court explained that UNC was only required to grant stu-
dents these rights when the student comes before UNC’s Honor
Court, and not when the student is accused of violating an NCAA
rule.129  Since McAdoo’s claim did not involve UNC’s handling of
McAdoo’s Honor Court trial, but rather UNC’s reporting of the vio-
124. See id. at 823 (discussing justiciability doctrine) (quoting In re Peoples,
250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978)).  The North Carolina Supreme Court defined the test
for mootness as whenever “it develops that the relief sought has been granted or
that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at
issue, the case should be dismissed.” Id.
125. See id. (discussing how McAdoo’s contract with Baltimore Ravens ren-
dered lawsuit moot).
126. See id. (“Because Plaintiff now plays professional football we find his
claims to be moot.”). The Baltimore Ravens released McAdoo on June 5, 2013, and
he remained an unsigned free agent at the beginning of the 2013 season. See Josh
Alper, Ravens Sign Tony Wragge, Waive-Injured Michael McAdoo, NBC SPORTS (June
12, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/06/12/ravens-
sign-tony-wragge-waive-injured-michael-mcadoo/ (stating Ravens waived McAdoo
from roster); see also Player Roster, BALTIMORERAVENS.COM, http://www.baltimorer-
avens.com/team/roster.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (failing to list McAdoo on
active roster or on injured reserve).  The Ravens cut McAdoo from the team prior
to the August 31, 2013 mandatory roster reduction deadline. See Ryan Van Bibber,
2013 NFL League Calendar Dates to Know, TURF SHOW TIMES (June 7, 2013, 2:34 PM),
http://www.turfshowtimes.com/2013/6/7/4407238/2013-nfl-league-calendar-ros-
ter-cuts-deadlines (stating NFL deadline that requires teams to reduce their roster
to fifty-three players).
127. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 824 (discussing McAdoo’s claim that UNC
failed to follow its own procedures as outlined in Instrument, which governs how
UNC is to address allegations of Honor Court violations by students).
128. See id. at 824-25 (noting UNC “is a state actor because it is a public uni-
versity” and must grant student’s due process rights when disciplining academic
dishonesty).
129. See id. (“[N]othing in the Instrument addresses students’ rights when
[they are] accused of violating NCAA regulations”).
24
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lation to the NCAA prior to the Honor Court’s determination, the
court concluded that McAdoo failed to present facts that his due
process rights were violated by a failure to comply with the Instru-
ment.130  Ultimately, the court held that UNC’s obligation to report
the alleged conduct to the NCAA was independent of UNC’s re-
quirements under the Instrument and therefore, the court dis-
missed McAdoo’s claims against UNC.131
2. Claims Against the NCAA
The McAdoo court initially noted that North Carolina courts
refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of private organiza-
tions, such as the NCAA.132  The court also discussed the standard
by which private organizations must follow their internal proce-
dures in order to avoid judicial oversight.133  While the court began
an analysis of how to address McAdoo’s claims against the NCAA,
the court did not determine whether the NCAA had in fact violated
McAdoo’s rights.134  Rather, the court held that since McAdoo gen-
erally did not have standing to bring the claims and because his
claims were now moot, the case should be dismissed without ad-
dressing the alleged violations by the NCAA.135
B. Critical Analysis: The Court in McAdoo “Blocks” Another
Claim to Protect the NCAA
The McAdoo decision maintained the tradition of granting judi-
cial deference to the NCAA’s enforcement of its own rules and reg-
130. See id. at 825 (explaining that McAdoo failed to demonstrate how UNC’s
compliance with NCAA regulations resulted in violation of his constitutional right
to due process).
131. See id. (“[T]he process required for violations of the Instrument is not
required for compliance with an Institution’s duties under the NCAA
[C]onstitution and [B]ylaws . . . .  [W]e conclude Plaintiff does not raise a justicia-
ble issue against UNC.”).
132. See id. at 825 (discussing judicial deference granted to private associa-
tions).  For a discussion on the judiciary’s hands off approach to review of private
associations, see infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
133. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 825 (explaining that rules and procedures of
private organizations must be fair).  The McAdoo court also acknowledged that the
appropriate test to apply to determine if a justiciable claim has been brought
against a private organization was the Topp test. See Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc.,
726 S.E.2d 884, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding a case be dismissed unless the
facts alleged demonstrate “1) the decision was ‘inconsistent with due process,’ or
2) the organization engaged in ‘arbitrariness, fraud, or collusion’”).
134. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d. at 826 (“We need not apply the Topp test to ana-
lyze the substance of Plaintiff’s claims against the NCAA.”).
135. See id. (holding that claimed injuries are too speculative and Plaintiff
cannot play for NCAA member institutions in future because he signed profes-
sional football contract).
25
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ulations.136  While the court recognized the appropriate precedent
for determining if a plaintiff has presented a justiciable claim
against a private, voluntary organization, the court neglected to ap-
ply this standard to McAdoo’s claims against the NCAA.137  Further-
more, the court’s decision in McAdoo provides another example of
how judicial deference leads a court to dismiss a case against the
NCAA without actually having to address the merits of the claim.138
Finally, the court failed to discuss McAdoo’s legal contention that
speculative damages should not be addressed prior to a jury trial,
thereby dismissing McAdoo’s claims without addressing precedent
that allowed judicial review of his case against the NCAA.139
1. Retiring to the Bench: How the Appellate Court’s Decision “Sidelines”
Appropriate Precedent in Favor of Judicial Deference
The McAdoo court’s decision to dismiss McAdoo’s claim on jus-
ticiability grounds followed the precedent of dismissing student-ath-
lete claims on a threshold question, rather than deciding on the
merits of the case.140  The McAdoo court correctly acknowledged
that the doctrines of standing and mootness are subsets of jus-
ticiability and that the test to determine if a claim against a private,
voluntary organization is justiciable is whether the “plaintiff alleges
facts showing (i) the decisions was ‘inconsistent with due process,’
or (ii) the organization engaged in ‘arbitrariness, fraud, or collu-
sion.’”141  While the McAdoo court introduced this appropriate pre-
cedent acknowledging the test for justiciability against an
organization like the NCAA, the court simply failed to apply it to
136. See id. at 825-26 (discussing judicial deference granted to private volun-
tary organizations and applying deference to claims against NCAA).
137. See id. at 826 (holding that court does not need to apply Topp test to
facts).  For further discussion of the court’s failure to apply established test for
determining if a justiciable claim has been raised against the decision of a volun-
tary organization, see infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
138. For further discussion of how the McAdoo court’s decision creates an-
other barrier to student-athlete claims against the NCAA under premise that stu-
dent-athletes cannot meet criteria for judicial review, see infra notes 146-151 and
accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the McAdoo court’s failure to address legal argument
related to speculative damages, see infra notes 152-158 and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of history of judicial deference resulting in continual
dismissal of student-athlete claims based on failure to affirmatively satisfy initial
procedural questions see supra notes 62-102 and accompanying text.
141. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 814 (“[C]oncepts of justiciability have been
developed to identify appropriate occasions for judicial action.”); see also id. at 825
(quoting Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., 726 S.E.2d 884, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012),
rev’d on other grounds, 366 N.C. 369 (2013)).
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McAdoo’s claims against the NCAA.142  Rather, the court deferred
to its discussion of the claims against UNC, holding that because
McAdoo’s injury was conjectural and because he had achieved his
goal of playing professional football, no justiciability issue existed
against the NCAA.143  Ultimately, by failing to apply North Caro-
lina’s justiciability test to the NCAA, the court defeated the purpose
of its own precedent, which sought to provide plaintiffs with access
to federal courts and allow courts to proceed with an examination
of the alleged wrongdoings of a private organization.144  Conse-
quently, the court’s decision to forgo a determination of whether
the NCAA’s actions were arbitrary or capricious further extends ju-
dicial deference to the NCAA and creates an additional barrier to
student-athletes’ lawsuits.145
2. Pulling One Out of the Old Playbook: The North Carolina Court of
Appeals Throws Case Out Before Addressing Potential Violation
of Rights by the NCAA
The McAdoo decision offers new precedent for both federal
and state courts seeking to dismiss a student-athlete’s claims against
the NCAA’s rules and regulations to avoid addressing the merits of
these claims.146  Both the Supreme Court and various circuit courts
have dismissed claims against the NCAA by determining that stu-
dent-athletes bringing suit failed to demonstrate sufficient facts to
satisfy the applicable threshold question.147  However, the North
142. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 825 (“[W]e need not apply the Topp test to
analyze the substance of the Plaintiff’s claims against the NCAA.”).
143. See id. at 826 (refusing to apply Topp test because “(i) Plaintiff does not
have standing to raise his claims; and (ii) his claims are not moot”).
144. See Topp, 726 S.E.2d at 889 (stating exception to judicial deference to-
ward private organizations warranting judicial review); see also Nat’l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass’n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Ky. 2001) (“[R]elief from our judicial
system should be available if voluntary athletic associations act arbitrarily and ca-
priciously toward student-athletes.”); see also, e.g., Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 920 N.E.2d 203, 215-16 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009) (determining NCAA’s Res-
titution Rule is arbitrary and breaches NCAA’s duty of good faith and fair dealing
toward Oliver).
145. See Szwabowski, supra note 64, at 87 (“Despite the numerous court deci-
sions regarding NCAA claims, these opinions had virtually no direct effect on the
NCAA.”).
146. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 826 (affirming dismissal due to McAdoo’s fail-
ure to raise justiciable claims).
147. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988)
(holding NCAA is not state actor and therefore, court does not need to determine
if NCAA violated due process rights of student-athletes); see also Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 462 (1990) (holding NCAA does not receive
federal funding and therefore, there is no need to address potential violation of
Title XI by NCAA); Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 198 F.3d 107, 118
27
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Carolina Court of Appeals is the first of these courts to dismiss a
student-athlete’s claims on justiciability grounds.148  Since jus-
ticiability is a preliminary inquiry by all United States courts, all
courts will dismiss the case if the appropriate threshold question is
not affirmatively answered.149  While justiciability and other thresh-
old questions are necessary forms of judicial restraint, some com-
mentators believe that the courts should generally review more
cases rather than dismissing them on justiciability grounds.150  Ad-
ditionally, because “precedents are sufficiently malleable to afford
ample opportunity for courts to avoid [a] decision on ‘justiciability’
grounds simply because [a] decision is thought [to be] inconve-
nient,” the McAdoo court created powerful precedent for the NCAA
to succeed in a student-athlete’s claims regarding the NCAA’s rules
and regulations.151
3. Blown Coverage: How the North Carolina Court of Appeals Failed to
Address McAdoo’s Legal Arguments Regarding Speculative
Damages
In addressing whether McAdoo’s claim for monetary damages
was speculative, the McAdoo court failed to consider McAdoo’s con-
tention that he could reasonably prove an injury, and instead ana-
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that since NCAA does not receive federal funding, stu-
dent-athlete claim can be dismissed without addressing potential violation of Title
VI by NCAA); Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir
1998) (dismissing Sherman Anti-Trust claim against NCAA on grounds that
NCAA’s actions are not commercial and therefore, court does not need to address
merits of case); Wiley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 612 F.2d at 477 (10th Cir.
1979) (dismissing case without ruling on merits because no substantial federal
question was presented).
148. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 826 (dismissing McAdoo’s claims for lack of
standing and mootness).  For a discussion of grounds on which courts have previ-
ously dismissed student-athlete claims, none of which include justiciability argu-
ments, see supra note 62-102 and accompanying text.
149. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3529 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing doctrine of
justiciability and how it is used by courts); see also McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 814-15
(discussing doctrines of standing and mootness as subcategories of justiciability).
150. See Szwabowski, supra note 64, at 94 (“The doctrine of judicial deference
has proven in the past and continues to demonstrate that at times the best role
that a court may play in a controversy is no role at all.”). But see id. at 29 n.3
(discussing competing views of judicial restraint including idea that sometimes
there is greater need for “judicial activism” to review cases).
151. See WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 149 (explaining debate about “extent to
which courts should in fact be free to avoid awkward decisions on grounds of ‘pru-
dence’ falling somewhere between implementation of strict principle and mere
caprice”).
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lyzed McAdoo’s third-party beneficiary argument.152  In its decision,
the McAdoo court agreed with the NCAA, who argued that allega-
tions regarding injury to a future career are too conjectural in na-
ture to establish standing.153  Additionally, the McAdoo court
distinguished the case from Bloom and Oliver (both of which held
that a student-athlete could succeed in a contract claim as a third-
party beneficiary) by contending that those plaintiffs did not allege
injuries to future careers.154  Therefore, the Bloom and Oliver courts
could address the merits of those cases.155
However, McAdoo’s Appellate Brief cited both Bloom and Oliver
only as support for his contention that he had standing to sue
under a breach of contract theory to which he was a third-party
beneficiary.156  Conversely, McAdoo claimed that damages should
have survived a motion to dismiss because North Carolina prece-
dent holds that the court cannot dismiss a claim based on poten-
tially speculative damages.157  As McAdoo stated in his Appellate
152. Compare McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 822-23 (holding McAdoo’s damages were
speculative and distinguishing McAdoo’s claim from cases discussions third-party
beneficiary status), with Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 30-31, McAdoo v. Univ. of
N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2011) (No. 11 CVS 3903)
(explaining how precedent demonstrates that North Carolina courts are not to
address issue of speculative damages during Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss) and
id. at 13-25 (discussing McAdoo’s contention that NCAA and UNC breached con-
tract, to which he is third-party beneficiary).
153. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 822 (citing Arendas v. N.C. High Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 718 S.E.2d 198, 199-200 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 1180 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509-10 (D.N.J. 1998), and Butler v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 06-2319 KHV, 2006 WL 2398683, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug.
15, 2006)) (“[W]hen disappointed student-athletes have presented similar argu-
ments to courts, both in this state and elsewhere, these claims for damages have
been rejected as speculative.”); Defendant-Appellee Brief at 13-15, McAdoo v.
Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2011) (No. 11 CVS
3903) (citing Arendas, 718 S.E.2d 200, Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 118
F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D.N.J. 2000), and Butler v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
No. 06-2319 KHV, 2006 WL 2398683, at *4 (D.C. Kan. Aug. 15, 2006)) (“[C]ourts
consistently have rejected claims by student-athletes alleging ‘lost opportunities’ in
sports endeavors.”).
154. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 822-23 (stating “the alleged injury in both
Bloom and Oliver did not concern future career prospects and earning potential”
and thus were factually distinguishable from McAdoo’s case).
155. See id. (concluding that because Bloom and Oliver were factually distin-
guishable from McAdoo’s case, those courts were able to probe further into those
plaintiffs’ claims).
156. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 18-20 (explaining that
McAdoo’s third-party beneficiary allegation has substantive legal support based on
decisions rendered in Ohio and Colorado).
157. See id. at 31-32 (stating that North Carolina trial court does not dismiss
claims for damages as speculative under Rule 12(b)(6)) (quoting Grant v. High
Point Reg. Health Sys., 645 S.E.2d 851, 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).  In Grant, the
court held that since the Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged actual damages
29
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Brief, North Carolina courts are required to address the issue of
speculative damages as a matter of law following the plaintiff’s pres-
entation of evidence at trial.158  While the NCAA agreed that this
legal precedent was appropriate to the McAdoo case, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals failed to address McAdoo’s argument on
this issue anywhere in its decision.159
V. TALLYING UP THE SCORE: THE NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF
APPEALS’ DECISION UNFAIRLY IMPACTS STUDENT-ATHLETE
CLAIMS AGAINST THE NCAA
The McAdoo court’s reliance on mootness as a means to dismiss
McAdoo’s claims creates another barrier to student-athlete lawsuits
because such claims are time sensitive and will rarely be decided
prior to a full-length appeals process.160  Ultimately, the McAdoo
court’s holding demonstrates that student-athletes are in a position
where regardless of what action, or inaction, they take, judicial re-
view of the merits of any case regarding the NCAA’s rules and regu-
lations is unlikely.161
A. How the McAdoo Court’s Mootness Rationale “Punted Away”
Student-Athletes’ Abilities to Succeed in
Claims Against the NCAA
Since a student-athlete must endure the NCAA appeals process
prior to filing suit, the McAdoo court’s dismissal of the case estab-
arising from the claim in question, there was a legally sufficient basis to withstand a
motion to dismiss. Id. (“[A]t the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we look only to whether the
allegations in a complaint, taken as true, state a legally cognizable claim.”).
158. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 30-31 (explaining that
cases cited by NCAA regarding speculative damages also did not address this issue
until after jury had determined damages could not be determined with reasonable
certainty).
159. See Defendant-Appellee Brief, supra note 153, at 16-17 (“McAdoo cor-
rectly notes that two cases cited below for the relevant damages standard . . . were
decided after trial.”).
160. See Hans E. Berg, et al., Hip, Thigh and Calf Muscle Atrophy and Bones Loss
After 5-Week Bed rest Inactivity, 99 EUR. J. APPLIED PHYSIOLOGY 283, 283 (2007) (“Un-
loaded inactivity induces atrophy and functional deconditioning of skeletal mus-
cle, especially in the lower extremities.”); see also Elizabeth Quinn, Use it or Lose it,
ABOUT.COM (July 10, 2013), http://sportsmedicine.about.com/od/anatomy-
andphysiology/a/Deconditioning.htm (explaining that one can maintain physical
ability generally but inability to do specific training can cause one to lose skills).
For a discussion on the time student-athletes can be forced to sit on the bench
prior to a hearing and decision from the NCAA or Courts, see supra notes 162-169
and accompanying text.
161. For a critique of why the court’s decision places student-athletes in a
position where they cannot succeed in a lawsuit against the NCAA, see infra notes
170-176 and accompanying text.
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lishes important precedent.162  This precedent makes it impossible
for student-athletes to succeed in claims against the NCAA because
the NCAA appeals process and court procedures are time inten-
sive.163  When the NCAA believes a potential violation of its rules
and regulations has occurred, the NCAA will gather basic informa-
tion and then, if necessary, commence a more in-depth investiga-
tion until the enforcement staff is satisfied that they have obtained
all available information.164  Once the investigation phase has con-
cluded, the next five months involve submission of information to
the NCAA’s Committee on Infractions, followed by a hearing, a re-
view of evidence, and testimony from witnesses.165
The Committee on Infractions takes ten to twelve weeks to in-
form those involved in the violation and publish an official deci-
sion, from which a party has fifteen days to file a notice of intent to
appeal.166  Overall, the NCAA asserts that it takes about 110 days for
a member institution to complete the internal appeals process;
162. For a discussion of the NCAA internal appeals process, which schools file
on behalf of student-athletes, see supra note 12 and accompanying text. R
163. For a discussion of how the court’s decision in McAdoo has prevented
success of future claims against the NCAA, see infra notes 177-185 and accompany-
ing text.
164. See ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 12, at art. 32.2, 32.4 (discussing
process and procedures of gathering initial information following contention that
there has been NCAA violation, based on severity of potential violation).  While
the NCAA does not designate how long the overall investigative process can take,
the DI Manual does assert that “the enforcement staff shall make reasonable ef-
forts to process infractions matters in a timely manner.” See ADMINISTRATIVE BY-
LAWS, supra note 12, at art. 32.3.2; see also Stu Brown, The NCAA Infractions
Enforcement Process, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/the_ncaa_in
fractions_enforcement_process_role_of_counsel.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013)
(discussing how NCAA investigation phase of infractions process consists of carry-
ing out “dozens of interviews and thousands of pages of documents” related to the
allegation).
165. See Brown, supra note 164 (discussing how members and individuals have R
ninety days to respond to notice of allegations followed by four to six weeks in
which NCAA enforcement staff drafts response and then additional week given to
institution and individuals to submit additional information to Committee, which
then leads to one-two day hearing); see also ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 12,
at art. 32.8 (detailing Committee on Infractions hearings procedures).  Member
institutions believed to have violated a major infraction may alternatively seek sum-
mary disposition, which allows the NCAA Committee on Infractions to review the
case following an investigation and once all reports have been submitted can deter-
mine an outcome during the next scheduled meeting. See ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS,
supra note 12, at art. 32.7 (discussing summary disposition process).
166. See ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 12, at art. 32.9 (stating procedures
for infractions report); see also Brown, supra note 164 (discussing time period and R
information  provided in Committee on Infractions’ report); ADMINISTRATIVE BY-
LAWS, supra note 12, at art. 32.10 - 32.11 (outlining NCAA internal appeals
process).
31
Tohanczyn: Fumble! How the North Carolina Courts Dropped the Ball in McAdoo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 87 Side B      09/19/2014   14:26:10
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 87 Side B      09/19/2014   14:26:10
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 32 26-JUN-14 12:43
416 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 385
however, the NCAA also acknowledges that appeals can sometimes
take additional time.167  After the NCAA appeals process has been
exhausted, student-athletes (unlike member institutions) may then
bring suit in either state or federal court, which is a notoriously slow
process.168
During the internal appeals process and a federal or state law-
suit, the NCAA’s rules and regulations require that schools with-
hold a student-athlete from competition, even if the student-athlete
has a court order enjoining enforcement of the NCAA’s rules
against the student-athlete.169  Additionally, Division I student-ath-
letes cannot put their college careers on hold to wait for a determi-
nation by the NCAA or a court because the NCAA Bylaws require
that student-athletes complete their four years of eligibility within
five years of starting college courses.170  Consequently, once the en-
167. See NCAA Rules Enforcement: Infractions Appeals Committee, NCAA.ORG,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-rules-enforcement-in-
fractions-appeals-committee (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (“The membership-ap-
proved process spells out a 110-day timeline, but it may take longer depending on
the complexity of the case.”).  In McAdoo’s case, the NCAA investigation began in
June of 2010, and the final NCAA appeal decision was rendered in February of
2011, totaling seven months and encompassing an entire collegiate football sea-
son. See McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 816 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013) (stating date NCAA began investigation of McAdoo); Heather Dinich,
UNC’s McAdoo Permanently Ineligible, ESPN.COM (Feb. 9, 2011, 6:14 PM), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6106202 (explaining UNC’s public an-
nouncement to uphold NCAA’s decision on February 9, 2011).
168. See ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 12, at art. 32.11.5 (explaining that
member institutions agree not to pursue appeal outside of NCAA).  Generally, two-
thirds of federal civil cases are resolved and reach final disposition within one cal-
endar year, but thirty-five percent of cases last longer than a year. See Civil Case
Processing in the Federal District Courts, INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS., 4
(2009), available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publica-
tions/PACER_FINAL_1-21-09.pdf.  McAdoo’s federal claim was filed on July 1,
2011, and the Court of Appeals decision was rendered on January 15, 2013, lasting
an additional eighteen months following the already slow NCAA internal appeal
process. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 815 (stating date McAdoo filed complaint
against UNC and NCAA).
169. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 14.11.1 (stating “if a student-
athlete is ineligible under the provisions of the constitution, [B]ylaws or other reg-
ulations of the Association, the institution shall be obligation to apply immediately
the applicable rule and to withhold the student-athlete from all intercollegiate
competition”); see also OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 19.7 (discussing how
member institutions can be sanctioned for allowing student-athlete to compete
even if in accordance with court order if court order is later vacated, stayed, or
reversed).  For further discussion on the NCAA Restitution Rule, see infra note 16
and accompanying text.  “The only reason teams suspend good players is fear of
having to forfeit wins.”  Barry Petchesky, Report: Alabama Assistant Loaned Money to
HaHa Clinton-Dix, DEADSPIN.COM (Oct. 3, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://deadspin.com/
report-alabama-assistant-loaned-money-to-haha-clinton-1440799155.
170. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 14.2.1 (stating student-athletes
have five years to complete eligibly and only exceptions are for those who join
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tire judicial process is complete, even if a student-athlete could be
successful on the merits of the case, the student-athlete would be
unable to compete in college athletics because his five years of eligi-
bility will most likely have passed.171
B. The Appeals Court’s Decision Gives the NCAA Home Field
Advantage in Contract Claims by Student-Athletes
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decision, holding that
McAdoo’s decision to sign a professional contract rendered his case
moot demonstrates an additional barrier that will prevent student-
athletes from succeeding in a breach of a contract claim against the
NCAA.172  Generally, a student-athlete’s contract claim against the
NCAA will allege that the NCAA breached a contract with the mem-
ber institution, of which the student-athlete was an intended third-
party beneficiary.173  In order to succeed in this claim, a student-
military service or engage in religious mission). But cf. John Infante, Reevaluating
the Most Important Rule, NCAA.ORG (Dec. 3, 2011), http://blog.ncaa.org/blog/
2011/12/reevaluating-the-most-important-rule/ (explaining DII and DIII have 10-
semester/15-quarter rule that allows student-athletes to stop eligibility clock while
awaiting reinstatement for competition).  DII and DIII have not adopted, but
rather have a more forgiving rule, which allows student-athletes to postpone their
eligibility by dropping out of school or becoming a part-time student until after
litigation. See id.
171. See Compliance 101, Session 3: Extension of the Five-Year Clock, GRFX.CSTV,
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/tam/genrel/auto_pdf/comp101-3-five-year-
clock-ext.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (“For an extension request to be success-
ful, the institution requesting it on behalf of the student-athlete must prove that
the student-athlete was deprived of more than one season of competition for rea-
sons beyond his or her control.”).
172. For discussion of how the court’s decision in McAdoo illustrates issues
with student-athlete’s contractual claims against the NCAA, see infra notes 171-184
and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Col.
Ct. App. 2004) (explaining  Bloom’s complaint alleged that he was entitled to pur-
sue contract claim against NCAA as third-party beneficiary); Oliver v. Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n., 920 N.E.2d 203, 211-12 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009)
(addressing Oliver’s claims that NCAA violated duty of good faith and fair dealing
in contract of which he was third-party beneficiary); Hall v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass’n., 985 F. Supp. 782, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (determining that student-
athletes are intended third-party beneficiaries and not incidental beneficiaries to
contract between NCAA and member institutions); Verified Amended Complaint
at 149-69, McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2011) (No. 11 CVS 3903), 2011 WL 8493961 (alleging that Defendants UNC and
NCAA breached provisions of the NCAA Bylaws, to which he is intended third-
party beneficiary).  In order to establish a third-party beneficiary claim in North
Carolina, a student-athlete must show: that “(1) the existence of a contract be-
tween two other persons; (2) that the contract was valid and enforceable; and (3)
that the contract was entered into for his direct, and not incidental, benefit.”
United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 263 S.E.2d 313, 317 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (internal
citation omitted).
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athlete must demonstrate that the contract was directly intended to
benefit him.174
The NCAA’s Constitution and Bylaws constitute a contract be-
tween the NCAA and its member schools in which the member
schools receive NCAA membership in exchange for an agreement
to comply with the NCAA’s Bylaws.175  The NCAA’s Constitution ex-
plicitly states the purpose of the rules and regulations is to confer a
benefit directly to student-athletes.176  Furthermore, a number of
lower courts have held that student-athletes are intended third-
party beneficiaries to the contract between the NCAA and its mem-
ber institutions, which allows student-athletes to sue the NCAA for
breach of contract or tortious interference with a contract when the
NCAA violates one of its Bylaws.177  While these decisions appear to
174. See, e.g., Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir.
1945) (third-party can only recover damages from contract that was made for his
“direct” or “primary” benefit); Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 178 N.E. 498,
501 (Ill. 1931) (“The test is whether the benefit to the third person is direct to him
or is but an incidental benefit to him arising from the contract.”); Voelkel v.
Tohulka, 141 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ind. 1957) (holding third parties may bring suit
under contracts made directly for their benefit); Khabbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d
279, 284-85 (Iowa. 1982) (explaining third-party can only enforce contract which
was made for his “express” benefit); Fasse v. Lower Heating and Air Conditioning,
Inc., 736 P.2d 930, 932  (Kan. 1987) (“The third-party beneficiary can enforce the
contract if he is one who the contracting parties intended should receive a direct
benefit from the contract.”); Toone v. Adams, 137 S.E.2d 132, 135 (N.C. 1964)
(“[W]here a contract between two parties is intended for the benefit of a third
party, the latter may maintain an action in contract for its breach or in tort if he
has been injured as a result of its negligent performance.”); Flaherty v. Weinberg,
492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985) (third party can sue despite lack of privity if parties
to agreement intended to benefit third-party); United States Trust Co., N.A. v.
Rich, 712 S.E.2d 233, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Revels v. Miss Am. Org.,
641 S.E.2d 721, 723 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)) (contract must have intended to benefit
third party and not have incidentally conferred benefit); Title Guar. & Trust Co. v.
Bushnell, 228 S.W. 699, 701 (Tenn. 1921) (“[T]he beneficiary, though not a party
to the contract, may maintain an action directly in his own name against the prom-
isor where such promise between the promisor and promisee is made upon suffi-
cient consideration for the benefit of the third party.”); Suthers v. Booker Hosp.
Dist., 543 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (third-party must not be donee or
creditor beneficiary and intended to be benefit based on plain meaning of
contract).
175. NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at art. 1.3.2 (“Member institutions
shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation, and the enforcement pro-
cedures of the Association shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill
this obligation.”).
176. See id. at art. 1.2(a) (stating that first purpose of NCAA is to “initiate,
stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
177. See Hall, 985 F. Supp. at 796-97 (discussing contractual relationship be-
tween NCAA and member institutions); see also Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623-24 (analyzing
plaintiff’s claim that student-athletes are third party beneficiaries to contract be-
tween NCAA and member institutions). But see English v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 439 So.2d 1218, 1223 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (stating student-athlete, who
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offer student-athletes support to succeed in future claims against
the NCAA, the McAdoo decision highlights reasons why these claims
will most likely not be successful.178
According to the McAdoo court, a student-athlete’s claims will
be moot if the student-athlete signs a contract with a professional
sports team either before or during pending litigation against the
NCAA.179  This decision is based on the NCAA’s amateurism princi-
ple, which states that entering into a draft or signing a contract to
play a professional sport renders the student-athlete ineligible to
compete in college sports.180  Additionally, the court in McAdoo
held that a student-athlete’s claims for monetary damages would
also be moot if the student-athlete signs a professional contract be-
cause the student-athlete has “obtained the relief sought.”181
However, if a student-athlete brings a claim against the NCAA
for damages and does not enter an available professional draft, the
NCAA will likely argue that under contract law the student-athlete
cannot recover because the student-athlete failed to mitigate poten-
tial damages.182  Generally, an individual seeking to recover for a
breach of contract has a legal obligation to minimize the effects
and losses of an injury.183  This duty extends to a third-party benefi-
ciary of a contract “because a third-party beneficiary has the duties
as well as rights of a signatory to a contract.”184  Therefore, a stu-
sought injunction against enforcement of NCAA transfer rule, was merely inciden-
tal beneficiary to contract between member institution and NCAA).
178. See Bill Cross, Comment, The NCAA as Publicity Enemy Number One, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (2010) (“Student-athletes or former student-athletes suing
the NCAA no longer need to rely on vague assertions of implied obligations;
rather, they can point directly to the NCAA’s own rules.”).
179. See McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 823 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013) (holding since McAdoo had signed contract with Baltimore Ravens, his
claims for mandamus and injunctive relief are moot).
180. See OPERATIVE BYLAWS, supra note 9, at art. 12.1.2(f) (“An individual loses
amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a
particular sport if the individual: After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, en-
ters into a professional draft.”); see also id. at art. 12.2.4 (discussing terms of draft
and inquiry).
181. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 823 (determining that no actions by any De-
fendants prevented McAdoo from becoming professional football player, which is
what McAdoo wanted).
182. For a discussion of why the NCAA would present this argument against a
student-athlete contract claim see infra notes 183-184 and accompanying text. R
183. See, e.g., Miller v. Mariner’s Church, 7 Me. 51, 55-56 (1830) (explaining
that if plaintiff could have prevented or reduced loss then recovery will be limited
by that consideration); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981)
(“[D]amages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided
without undue risk, burden or humiliation.”).
184. See Wenfang Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The duty
to mitigate is a conventional part of the common law of contracts and can be
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dent-athlete who alleges injury to a future professional career be-
cause of the NCAA’s breach of contract will most likely face the
argument that their failure to enter a professional draft or actively
seek a professional contract precludes them from recovery.185  Con-
sequently, regardless of whether a student-athlete actively seeks a
professional career or attempts to protect his or her amateurism by
sitting out of competition, the court has placed student-athletes in a
position where they are unlikely to succeed in contract claims
against the NCAA.186
enforced against a third-party beneficiary.”); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.1405 (West 2012) (“Any person for whose benefit a promise is made by way
of contract, as hereinafter defined, has the same right to enforce said promise that
he would have had if the said promise had been made directly to him as the prom-
ise.”); Anderson v. Rexroad, 306 P.2d 137, 147 (Kan. 1957) (holding third-party
beneficiaries had a duty to mitigate damages); Cordero Mining Co. v. U.S. Fidelity
& Guarantee Ins. Co., 67 P.3d 616, 626 (Wyo. 2003) (“[T]hird-party beneficiary
claims arising out of an alleged failure to exercise ordinary care are subject to the
same defenses as would be available in an action between the actual parties to the
contract.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309(4) (1981) (“A benefici-
ary’s right against the promisor is subject to any claim or defense arising from his
own conduct or agreement.”).
185. For a discussion of obligation to mitigate damages, see supra note 184 R
and accompanying text.  This defense requiring a student-athlete to limit their in-
jury by obtaining some type of professional contract has limitations against football
players because a player is not eligible to enter the NFL draft until three years after
graduating high school. See National Football League Eligibility Rules, NFL REG’L
COMBINES, https://www.nflregionalcombines.com/Docs/Eligibility%20rules.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (“No player shall be . . . eligible for the draft, until
three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended following either his graduation
from high school or graduation of the class with which he entered high school,
whichever is earlier.”).  Similarly, this defense may have some limited application
against basketball players due to the NBA draft rules. See Article X: Player Eligibility
and NBA Draft, NBPA, http://www.nbpa.org/sites/nbpa.org/files/ARTICLE%20X
.pdf (last visited May 24, 2013) (requiring player be at least “19 years of age during
the calendar year in which the Draft is held, and . . . at least one NBA Season has
elapsed since the player’s graduation from high school or . . . since the graduation
of the class with which the player would have graduated”).  While baseball players
are eligible to enter the Major League Baseball (MLB) Draft immediately after
high school, if a player decides to attend a four-year college then he is barred from
entering the MLB draft until after his sophomore year. See First-Year Player Draft:
Official Rules, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited May
24, 2013) (stating eligibility requirements for MLB draft).  But see Delany: Let Players
Bypass College, ESPN.COM (Sept. 26, 2013, 12:14 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/9723411/big-ten-commissioner-jim-delany-discusses-possible-
football-basketball-changes (quoting Big Ten Commissioner, Jim Delany, as stating
that student-athletes should be able to enter professional football or basketball
straight out of high school because colleges and universities should not be “minor
leagues” for professional sports).
186. For a discussion of how the McAdoo court has made it almost impossible
for student-athletes to succeed in a contract claim against the NCAA, see supra
notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
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VI. GUIDE FOR PRACTICING ATTORNEYS: HOW TO PREVENT COURTS
FROM MOVING THE GOALPOST WHEN STUDENT-ATHLETES
SUE THE NCAA
For the foreseeable future, both state and federal courts will
continue to grant the NCAA’s rules and regulations tremendous
deference in suits brought by student-athletes.187  In order to over-
come this deferential standard in a student-athlete contract claim,
attorneys should be prepared to argue why student-athletes are
third-party beneficiaries, and to raise defenses to the NCAA’s claim
that a student-athlete has a duty to mitigate damages by entering a
professional draft.188  Additionally, an attorney should defend a
motion to dismiss by asserting that damages to a future professional
career are not inherently speculative.189  Finally, at trial, an attorney
should present projected draft information from an already estab-
lished professional advisory committee as evidence of the student-
athlete’s damages and as a basis for awarding damages.190
A. Overcoming the Argument of Mootness
Based on reasoning from various decisions, student-athletes
would most likely succeed in alleging that the NCAA’s relevant ac-
tions breached the contract with the member institution, of which
the student-athlete is a third-party beneficiary.191  However, a stu-
dent-athlete bringing this claim must also be able to overcome the
breaching party’s defenses, including the obligation to reduce dam-
187. See Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, NCAA v. Lasege and Judicial Intervention in
Educational Decisions: The Kentucky Supreme Court Shoots an Air Ball for Kentucky Educa-
tion, 90 KY. L.J. 329, 338 (2001-2002) (“The sound and historic judicial policy
of deference to educational standards pertains forcefully to standards that volun-
tary higher education associations, such as the NCAA, adopt.”).
188. For an explanation of how a student-athlete’s entrance into a profes-
sional draft is unreasonable, see infra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of why damages to a student-athlete’s professional ca-
reer are not speculative simply because the student-athlete has not yet been
drafted or offered a professional contract, see infra note 219 and accompanying
text.
190. For an explanation of the current professional advisory committees and
why their analysis of student-athlete’s draft potential should be used as evidence of
damages, see infra notes 208-219 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 623-24
(Col. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing student-athletes have standing to sue NCAA as
third-party beneficiaries); Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 920 N.E.2d 203,
211 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009) (stating Oliver was intended third-party beneficiary
of contract between NCAA and member university); Hall v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass’n., 985 F. Supp. 782, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (determining student-athletes
are intended and not incidental third-parties to contract between NCAA and mem-
ber institutions).
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ages.192  Because a court will automatically dismiss a claim by a stu-
dent-athlete who has entered into a professional draft or signed a
professional contract as moot, a student-athlete who wishes to sue
the NCAA successfully cannot attempt to pursue a professional ca-
reer while litigation is pending.193
A student-athlete can likely defeat the NCAA’s contractual de-
fense of a duty to mitigate by arguing that mitigation through enter-
ing into the professional draft is unreasonable.194  Generally, the
requirement that a plaintiff take steps to reduce the alleged injury
is based in equity and therefore, only requires that an individual do
what is reasonable under the circumstances.195  For a student-ath-
lete, this obligation requires a young adult, usually between the
ages of twenty and twenty-two, to negotiate and form a contract with
a professional team that will dictate the student-athlete’s future ca-
reer and financial stability.196  Additionally, signing a professional
192. For a discussion of a student-athlete’s duty to mitigate as third-party ben-
eficiaries, see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
193. See McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 823 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013) (holding McAdoo’s claims are moot because he signed contract with
Baltimore Ravens).
194. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sandlin, 272 S.W. 912, 916 (Ky. Ct. App.
1925) (“[T]his obligation to minimize the damages when it arises never requires
the party to do more than exercise ordinary care to that end.”); Bridgeport v.
Aetna Indem. Co., 105 A. 680, 683 (Conn. 1919) (stating that plaintiff must only
do what is “reasonable under the circumstances”).
195. See, e.g., Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ret. Solutions, Inc., 242
F. Supp.2d 438, 453 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (stating that duty exists to avoid additional
damage “with reasonable effort and without undue expense”); Bass v. Janney
Montgomery Scott, Inc., 210 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cook & Nich-
ols, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 480 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1971)) (stating that party injured by contract or tort “bound to exercise reasonable
care and diligence to avoid loss or to minimize or lessen the resulting damage, and
to the extent that his damages are the result of his active and unreasonable en-
hancement thereof, or due to his failure to exercise such care and diligence, he
cannot recover”) (citation omitted); Robinson v. United States, 305 F.3d 1330,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b
(1981)) (“[A] party cannot recover damages for loss that he could have avoided by
reasonable efforts.”) (emphasis added); Parker v. 20th Century Fox, 3 Cal.3d 176,
181-82 (Cal. 1970) (employee injured from breach of employment contract must
only take reasonable efforts to secure other employment); Chandler v. Gen. Mo-
tors Acceptance Corp., 426 N.E.2d 521, 522 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing
defendant is not obligated to pay damages which the plaintiff could have avoided
“without undue risk, expense, or humiliation”).
196. See Warren K. Zola, Supporting Student-Athletes in Their Transition to the
Pros: A Financial Argument, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2011, 7:41 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/warren-k-zola/college-sports-scandals_b_980935.html
(explaining decisions that student-athletes face when they attempt to become pro-
fessional athletes); see also Glenn M. Wong, et al., supra note 3, at 574-75 (discuss-
ing negative impacts on student-athletes who do not have adequate guidance when
transitioning from college to professional sports).
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contract would also require a student-athlete to withdraw from col-
lege and to forgo obtaining a degree, which contradicts the NCAA’s
core principle of promoting academics before athletics.197  Conse-
quently, a court would likely find that compelling a student-athlete
to minimize injury affirmatively to a future career by entering a pro-
fessional draft simply to be able to recover damages for a breach of
contract is unreasonable and therefore would not be required.198
B. Overcoming the Argument of Speculativeness
The court in McAdoo held that a student-athlete could not re-
cover monetary damages for injury to a future professional career
because determining the actual injury would be too speculative
and, therefore, a student-athlete does not have standing to sue
under this contention.199  Generally, to survive a motion to dismiss
a plaintiff must simply present sufficient facts that demonstrate he
is entitled to relief even if the relief sought is “very remote and un-
likely.”200  McAdoo’s Appellate Brief raised this contention citing
North Carolina law, which provides that courts cannot address dam-
197. See Complaint at 3, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Corbett, No. 3:02-at-
06000, 2013 WL 693401 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (stating NCAA’s purpose is to “govern
competition in a fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner, and to integrate
intercollegiate athletics into higher education so that the educational experience
of the student-athlete is paramount”).  In 2005 the NCAA began tracking academic
progress and has stated that schools that fail to make sufficient progress will face
sanctions from the NCAA. See Division I Academic Reform, NCAA.ORG, http://www
.ncaa.org/governance/reform-efforts#awg (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (outlining
new reform policy); see also NCAA Academic Reform, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa
.org/wps/wcm/connect/archive/library/Research+Archive/Education+and+Re
search/Academic+Reform/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (providing links to aca-
demic progress rates as well as lists of penalties).  The University of Connecticut
men’s basketball program faced a one year postseason ban as a result of low aca-
demic progress rate scores. See Adam Himmelsbach, UConn is Among Those Barred
from Postseason Basketball, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at B17, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/sports/ncaabasketball/uconn-basketball-is-among-
those-to-receive-postseason-ban.html (explaining that “ten Division I basketball
teams and five teams from other sports were penalized” for poor academic per-
formance, but “Connecticut was the most prominent team to be disciplined”).
198. See Bridgeport v. Aetna Indep. Co., 105 A. 680, 683 (Conn. 1919)
(describing test for reasonableness as “one which had a broader outlook and took
into account all the circumstances of the situation”).
199. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 822 (deferring to other court decisions which
held that claim for “special damages” is too conjectural to allow recovery).
200. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (explaining that test for
court is to determine if complaint states adequate claim and not if recovery is pos-
sible); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (stating that
claim must only raise enough facts, that if taken as true, suggest claim has basis);
see also Peebles v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 723 F. Supp. 1155, 1155 (D. S.C.
1989) (holding that pro se plaintiff that “filed numerous randomly labelled [sic]
pleadings and motions” that failed to state a cognizable claim against NCAA lacked
standing).
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ages as speculative until after a trial has occurred.201  The North
Carolina Court of Appeals failed to recognize this precedent and
thus left this argument open to student-athletes who in future com-
plaints sufficiently provide evidence that damage to a future profes-
sional career occurred because of the NCAA’s breach of
contract.202
Prior to trial, a student-athlete’s claim will likely face a motion
to dismiss on the basis that injury to a future professional career is
“inherently speculative.”203  To withstand a motion to dismiss, a stu-
dent-athlete should argue that the injury sustained to his or her
career is not “too speculative” because an insurance program pro-
vided by the NCAA allows student-athletes to recover an estimated
amount for this future career.204  The Exceptional Student-Athlete
Disability Insurance program (“ESDI”), provides student-athletes
competing in football, men or women’s basketball, baseball, or
men’s ice hockey “with the opportunity to protect against future
loss of earnings as a professional athlete due to a disabling injury or
sickness that may occur during the collegiate career.”205  To be eli-
201. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 31 (citing Grant v. High
Point Reg. Health Sys., 645 S.E.2d 851, 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)).  In Grant, the
court held that “at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we look only to whether the allegations
in a complaint, taken as true, state a legally cognizable claim.” See id. McAdoo’s
appellate brief also pointed out that the NCAA’s cases on this point also addressed
the issue of speculative damages following the presentation of evidence at a trial.
See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 31 (citing Olivetti Corp. v. Ames
Bus. Sys., Inc., 356 S.E.2d 578 (N.C. 1987) and Iron Steamer, Ltd. v. Trinity Restau-
rant, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 767, 771 (N.C. 1993)) (finding that Plaintiff had failed to
present facts that establish damages within reasonable certainty).
202. See McAdoo, 736 S.E.2d at 821-23 (failing to discuss assertion that issues
regarding certainty of damages should be addressed following trial).
203. See Defendant-Appellee Brief, supra note 153, at 16 (“North Carolina
courts will not hesitate to dismiss cases under Rule 12(b)(6) where, as here, a
plaintiff’s damages are inherently speculative.”).
204. See id. at 16 (contending that “claims for certain kinds of damages can be
dismissed by the trial court as too speculative”) (citing Pinehurst Area Reality, Inc.
v. Vil. of Pinehurst, 394 S.E.2d 251, 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)).
205. See Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, NCAA.ORG,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/student-athlete-insurance-pro-
grams (last visited May 12, 2014) (explaining parameters of disability insurance
program).  This program provides student-athletes with a lump sum payment
twelve months after the NCAA has determined that the student-athlete has suf-
fered a career ending injury. See id. (discussing permanent total disability stan-
dards).  The ESDI policy pays coverage ranging from $250,000 up to $5 million.
See Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, The Legal & Business Aspects of Career-Ending
Disability Insurance Policies in Professional and College Sports, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 473, 507 (2010) (“The NCAA’s ESDI program, administered through HCC
Life Insurance Company, caps coverage at $5 million for projected first-round NFL
draft picks and for men’s basketball student-athletes. Coverage for baseball, men’s
ice hockey and women’s basketball is capped at $1.5 million, $1.2 million and
$250,000 respectively.”).
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gible a student-athlete must demonstrate that he or she has the po-
tential to be selected in either the first three rounds of the National
Football League or National Hockey League draft, or the first
round of the upcoming National Basketball Association, Major
League Baseball, or Women’s National Basketball Association
draft.206  Consequently, the NCAA relies on draft predictions for
eligibility to a policy, demonstrating that a potential future career is
not speculative and a monetary amount can be determined.207
If a student-athlete’s claim survives a motion to dismiss, then
during a trial on the merits, a student-athlete must present enough
evidence to demonstrate to a jury that damages occurred; however,
the exact amount of injury sustained does not need to be certain.208
In order to succeed in demonstrating that some damage occurred,
a student-athlete can use as evidence a number of existing advisory
programs designed to help student-athlete’s determine whether the
206. See Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, supra note 205 R
(stating that eligibility for disability program requires determining potential to be
selected in professional draft).
207. See Joseph Stuart Knight, Comment, Blown Coverage: Tackling Problems with
the NCAA’s Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, 1 MISS. SPORTS L.J.
157, 166 (2012) (“[D]raft projections that the NCAA uses to decide who is and is
not eligible for ESDI coverage [are] purely speculative.”).  Thus, individuals in
charge of determining track student-athletes like draft experts and scouts to deter-
mine likelihood of a professional sports career in order to provide an adequate
policy. See Mike Herndon, NCAA Insurance Program Protects Elite Athletes, Future Earn-
ings Against Injury, ALLALABAMA.COM (Aug. 1, 2010, 6:03 AM), http://www.al.com/
sports/index.ssf/2010/08/are_you_in_good_hands.html (quoting private insur-
ance agent who follows student-athletes in order to “validate that number to the
insurance agency”).
208. See, e.g., Amigo Broad., LP v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., 521 F.3d 472, 483
(5th Cir. 2008) (“While some uncertainty as to the amount of damages is permissi-
ble, uncertainty as to the fact of damages will defeat recovery.”); Pfahler v. Nat’l
Latex Products Co., 517 F.3d 816, 837 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that speculative
damages warranting dismissal requires that facts of damages be uncertain and not
amount of damages); Air Safety, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 94
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that uncertainty regarding the amount of damages
does not prevent ability so long as plaintiff claim has provided facts demonstrating
injury) (citing Snelling & Snelling of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Wall, 189 N.E.2d 231,
232 (Mass. 1963) (“[T]he complaining party must establish his claim upon a solid
foundation in fact, and cannot recover when any essential element is left to conjec-
ture, surmise or hypothesis.”); Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631,
636-37 (2d Cir. 1946) (“The rule which proscribes the recovery of uncertain and
speculative damages applies where the fact of damages is uncertain, not where the
amount is uncertain.”); Leonard v. Pearce, 271 Ill. App. 428, 449 (1933) (“It is
impossible to prove the exact amount of damages sustained, but this is no reason
for denying damages altogether.”); Ensink v. Mecosta Cnty. Gen. Hosp., 687 Mich.
App. 518, 525-26 (2004) (stating that failure to determine damages with mathe-
matical provision does not preclude recovery); Aircraft Guaranty Corp. v. Strato-
Lift, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 735, 739-40 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that summary judg-
ment should not be granted when only amount of damages is uncertain and not
existence of damages).
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student-athlete is likely to be drafted and thus, be able to have a
professional sports career.209
For example, the NCAA Bylaws allow member institutions to
establish a Professional Sports Counseling Panel (“Panel”) in order
to “provide guidance to student-athletes regarding future profes-
sional athletic careers.”210  More specifically, these Panels not only
advise student-athletes but also “assist the student-athlete in deter-
mining his or her market value (e.g. potential salary, draft sta-
tus).”211  Furthermore, student-athletes competing in football may
also submit paperwork to the NFL’s College Advisory Committee
(CAC), whose purpose is “to give college underclassmen an idea of
what their NFL value is heading into the draft.”212  In order to pro-
vide student-athletes with the most accurate assessment, at least
four different NFL teams and two scouting combines review a stu-
dent-athlete’s information.213  Together, these organizations try to
arrive at a consensus opinion regarding the most likely round the
student-athlete would be drafted, but if no consensus is reached,
then additional teams will review the student-athlete’s informa-
tion.214  Ultimately, the CAC provides the student-athlete with an
evaluation, which informs the student-athlete if he or she has “the
ability to be drafted” in round one through seven or if they will
most likely not be drafted.215  Similarly, student-athletes competing
in basketball may also seek a draft projection from the National
Basketball Association’s (NBA) Undergraduate Advisory Commit-
209. For a discussion of the available student-athlete advisory committees, see
infra notes 210-218 and accompanying text. R
210. See Glenn M. Wong, et al., supra note 3, at 575 (discussing reasons why
NCAA adopted legislations to allow member institutions to form PSCPs).
211. See Operative Bylaws, supra note 9, at art. 12.3.4 (stating permissible ac-
tions and purposes of professional sports counseling panels).
212. See Greg Gabriel, How does the NFL College Advisory Committee Work?, NAT’L
FOOTBALL POST (Dec. 16, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/
How-does-the-NFL-College-Advisory-Committee-work.html (explaining purpose of
NFL advisory committee).
213. See id. (stating organizations that form NFL advisory committee and how
they review student-athlete’s application).
214. See id. (explaining evaluation process which includes involvement from
every NFL team and two scouting combines).
215. See NFL Advisory Committee Details, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 21, 2010, 2:44 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/13682485/26580096 (explaining
how student-athletes are given “grades” that are broken down into five categories:
“1st round, 2nd round, 3rd round, 4th-7th round, and unlikely to be drafted”); see
also Gabriel, supra note 212 (citing language used in evaluation to student-athlete R
from CAC).  While this projection can provide student-athletes with valuable infor-
mation, it is non-binding and does not guarantee that a team will actually draft
student-athlete in that particular round. See Glenn M. Wong, et al., supra note 212,
at 567 (stating that despite benefits of program, projections are not guaranteed).
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tee (UAC), which is comprised of NBA team executives.216  While
this evaluation by the UAC is “only an educated assessment and is
not binding in any way or a commitment of guarantee that a player
will or will not be drafted in a certain slot or at all,” it provides
student-athletes with insight by “testing the waters” through draft
projections.217  Overall, these three programs offer student-athletes
information to make an informed decision about whether to leave
school early and enter the draft.218
Generally, courts accept appraisals regarding the amount of
damages in a wide variety of cases from experts in order to aid the
jury.219  Furthermore, courts have also allowed professionals to pro-
vide projections regarding a loss of future income based on a read-
ing of relevant facts.220  Similarly, the professionals and experts
216. See Luke Adams, Draft Deadlines Facing NCAA Underclassmen HOOPS RU-
MORS (Mar. 20, 2013, 12:59 PM), http://www.hoopsrumors.com/2013/03/draft-
deadlines-facing-ncaa-underclassmen.html (“The committee allows players to get
feedback on their draft stock from a committe [sic] of NBA executives that in-
cludes GMs, assistant GMs, and VP’s of player personnel.”).
217. See Warren K Zola, Transitioning to the NBA: Advocating on Behalf of Student-
Athletes for NBA & NCAA Rules Changes, 3 HARV. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 159, 183 (2012)
(explaining actions college basketball players can take to determine whether they
wish to leave school and enter draft, including seeking evaluation from UAC).
The NCAA has greatly diminished the benefit of this evaluation by requiring that a
student-athlete withdraw from entering the NBA draft at an earlier date, which
limits how much time student-athletes can weigh the evaluation given to them by
the UAC. See Jonathan Givony, Testing the NBA Draft Waters in 2012, DRAFT EXPRESS
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.draftexpress.com/article/Testing-the-NBA-Draft-Wa-
ters-in-2012-3869 (explaining how NCAA has moved up deadline to withdraw from
draft from June 18th to April 10th in 2012).
218. See, e.g., Glenn M. Wong, et al., supra note 3, at 575 (discussing intent of
NCAA Bylaw establishing PSCP as means to provide student-athletes with guidance
regarding their professional careers); Gabriel, supra note 212 (“The league as well R
as the colleges wanted to get the players proper information so that the player
could make an intelligent decision as to either leave school early and enter the
draft or go back to school for another year.”); Adams, supra note 214 (“[T]he
advisory committe [sic] is generally very conservative with its projections for play-
ers, so as not to encourage a prospect to leave school early only to be
disappointed.”).
219. See, e.g., Julian Petroleum Corp. v. Courtney Petroleum Co., 22 F.2d 360,
362-63 (9th Cir. 1927) (holding that expert testimony could be used to determine
uncertain losses regarding failure to build and operate oil well over time); Whee-
land v. Fredonia Gas Co., 139 P. 1010, 1011 (Kan. 1914) (holding that where only
way for plaintiff to establish claim for damages is to provide expert opinions, esti-
mations by experts are sufficient to be brought before jury); Seabaugh v. Milde
Farms, Inc., 816 S.W.2d 202, 208-09 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (holding that if witness
“possesses peculiar knowledge, wisdom or skill regarding the subject of inquiry,
acquired by study, investigation, observation, practice or experience” then opinion
can be given to aid jury); Rochester & S.R. Co. v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. 289, 293
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1854) (“[T]he opinion of witnesses enters, of necessity, as a large
ingredient into the evidence which enables the jury to estimate the damages.”).
220. See Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 92-94 (Mo. 1985) (hold-
ing that law school professors could render opinions regarding injured plaintiff’s
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involved in the student-athlete advisory committees can also deter-
mine the loss to a student-athlete’s future professional career based
on their experiences and positions within the sports arena, which
the courts can accept as evidence in determining damages.221
VII. CONCLUSION
Due to its position as the main governing body of collegiate
sports, the NCAA has faced numerous lawsuits from student-ath-
letes.222  However, student-athletes rarely succeed in these claims
because of the judicial deference given to the NCAA as a private
and voluntary organization.223  In order for greater success in
claims regarding the NCAA’s enforcement of its rules and regula-
likelihood of success as a lawyer and therefore, give determination as to plaintiff’s
losses to future career); see also Lasha v. Olin Corp., 634 So.2d 1354, 1358 (3d Cir.
1994) (determining amount of damages for personal injury based on testimony
from economics professor at Louisiana State University and vocational rehabilita-
tion specialist); Garrett v. Celino, 489 So.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
while loss of future earnings cannot be determined with mathematical certainty,
“calculations from actuarial expert merit substantial consideration by the trier of
fact).  Such expert opinions, made based on facts and adequate data are to be
weighed by the jury not the judge. See Capra v. Phillips Inv. Co., 302 S.W.2d 924,
931 (Mo. 1957) (en banc) (“[P]laintiffs’ expert’s opinion [was] based on substan-
tive evidence” and therefore, “[t]he weight of his testimony was for the jury”).
221. For a discussion of qualifications of members of the advisory committees,
see supra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 552-53 (3d
Cir. 2002) (asserting that NCAA initial eligibility requirement violates civil rights
through discrimination); Arlosoroff v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F.2d
1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984) (claiming that NCAA violated equal protection and due
process); Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 683 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir.
2012) (alleging that NCAA’s cap on financial aid violates Sherman Anti-Trust Act
and Clayton Act); Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 577 F. Supp. 356, 362-
63 (D. Ariz. 1983) (seeking injunction against enforcement of NCAA sanctions on
basis that they violate constitutionally protected rights and violate Sherman Anti-
trust Act); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 9 (1994) (determin-
ing whether NCAA drug testing program violated student-athletes’ rights to privacy
under California Constitution); Matthews v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 179 F.
Supp.2d 1209, 1213 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (addressing whether NCAA violated Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act and Washington Law Against Discrimination); Beth A.
Cianfrone & Thomas A. Baker III, The Use of Student-Athlete Likeness in Sport Video
Games: An Application of the Right to Publicity, 20 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORTS 35, 35-36
(2010) (describing student-athlete’s suit against videogame developer and NCAA
under violation of right to publicity); Sarah McCarthy, Comment, The Legal and
Social Implications of the NCAA’s Pregnancy Exception - Does the NCCAA Discriminate
against Male Student-Athletes, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 327, 328-29 (2007) (dis-
cussing claim brought by male student-athlete alleging discrimination under Title
IX).
223. For a critique of the court’s current approach to claims against the
NCAA, see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of how the
North Carolina Court of Appeals followed this precedent of judicial deference, see
supra notes 140-158 and accompanying text.
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tions, student-athletes must allege the necessary facts in their com-
plaints and provide the appropriate precedent allowing judicial
review.224  Additionally, the courts must also be more willing to ad-
dress the merits of cases against the NCAA rather than dismissing
them before trial.225  In doing so, the courts would provide student-
athletes with a realistic ability to challenge the NCAA’s rules and
regulations.226
Katherine D. Tohanczyn*
224. For guidance regarding prevention of having claims dismissed, see supra
notes 200-206.
225. See Szwabowski, supra note 64, at 68 (explaining how judicial deference
toward NCAA developed in early 1970s due to impression that student-athlete
claims were “increasingly unnecessary and unproductive”).
226. See Eckert, supra note 31, at 935 (“The many rights guaranteed by the
NCAA Constitution (including the right to a safe environment and the right to an
education commensurate to that offered to other students) could now be the sub-
ject of cognizable claims if student-athletes can clear the necessary evidentiary
hurdles.”).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. magna
cum laude, Chestnut Hill College, 2012.
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